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INTRODUCTION
In the coming year, the political leadership in Iraq will need to
make a final determination as to whether they are going to structure
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the state of Iraq as a federal state with ethnically heterogeneous
provinces, a loose federal state with ethnically defined provinces or
regions, or whether they are going to divide the state into three new
states based on ethno-sectarian lines.
A number of prominent American law makers and foreign policy
shapers have strongly advocated for the soft, and sometimes hard,
partition of Iraq—either through the creation of a loose federal
structure based on ethno-sectarian lines, or through its outright
partition. 1 These commentators have prophesized that the ethnosectarian division of Iraq “may soon be all we have left.” 2
In fact, the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq is fraught with
logistical infeasibilities and dangers that threaten to compound the
issues facing the people of Iraq instead of solving them. The
political solution rests not on a return to failed approaches of division
and entrenched conflict, but rather on the construction of a viable
modern federal state that promotes unity, political compromise, and
consensus building.
To address the question of whether the future of Iraq rests with
ethno-sectarian division or with multi-ethnic federalism, this Article
first addresses the ideas behind ethno-sectarian division and
describes the most prominent plans for the division of Iraq along
ethno-sectarian lines. This Article then critiques such a division of
Iraq by: (1) identifying the overwhelming lack of popular support for
such a division; (2) exposing the practical and political difficulties of
dividing a state as diverse and heterogeneous as Iraq; (3) discussing
the likelihood that ethno-sectarian division will increase violent
conflict; (4) highlighting the lessons of prior ethno-sectarian
divisionist attempts; (5) noting insurmountable constitutional
hurdles; and (6) setting out the significant signs of recent progress
and cooperation in the Iraqi political framework.

1. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Op-Ed., A Plan to Hold Iraq Together, WASH. POST,
Aug. 24, 2006, at A21.
2. EDWARD P. JOSEPH & MICHAEL E. O’HANLON, BROOKINGS INST.,
ANALYSIS PAPER NO. 12: THE CASE FOR SOFT PARTITION IN IRAQ, 31 (2007),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/06iraq_
joseph/06iraq_joseph.pdf (underlining the problems associated with a soft partition
before admitting the options in Iraq are narrowing).
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Next, this Article sets forth a plan for an enhanced federal
structure based on the existing Iraq Constitution and recent Iraqi
laws. The proposal begins with the fundamental position that Iraq
requires a federalist structure based upon an eighteen governorate
model as set forth in the Constitution. With the sub-federal
boundaries already drawn, Iraqis are in a position to devolve
appropriate power to these entities in an asymmetric and gradual
manner. With this power devolution, Iraq would benefit from the
development of resource and revenue distribution systems to
promote fair and equitable economic growth across the federation.
Coordination mechanisms, such as framework legislation and dispute
resolution committees, could be established to ensure that the
transition to viable federalism occurs with minimal encumbrance. To
respect the complex and diverse identities of Iraqis, the government
must erect safeguards to protect the rights of sub-federal entities and
Iraq’s many minorities.

I. ETHNO-SECTARIAN DIVISION
Ethno-sectarian division involves the partition or decentralization
of a state along ethnic and/or sectarian lines. 3 At the core of ethnosectarian division argument is the so-called security dilemma. 4
According to Professor Robert Jervis of Columbia University, the
security dilemma exists when one community faces a distrustful
“other” while at the same time its own defensive actions are viewed
as antagonistic to the security of that other. 5 Thus, when war begins,
3. Great debate exists surrounding the definition and use of the terms
“ethnicity” or “ethnic” and “sectarian.” Some prefer the former, while others prefer
the latter. From our vantage point, both appear to have valid arguments. To avoid
this fray, we have intentionally chosen the term ethno-sectarian. Our intent is to
use this term as broadly and inclusively as possible and to leave the nuances to
those more versed in the subject. Therefore, for the purposes of this Article, the use
of the term ethno-sectarian division refers to division of Iraq along primarily
Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurdish lines.
4. See JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 2 n.2 (explaining that the
security dilemma is “[d]rawn from the realist school of international relations, . . .
[and] that in a state of anarchy, one state’s defensive action makes everyone less
secure.”).
5. See Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD
POLITICS 167, 169-70 (1978) (contemplating the difficulty in increasing personal,
community, or national security without appearing threatening to other groups);
see also Barry Posen, The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, SURVIVAL,
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mobilization of all members of one group is necessary, as other
groups are likely to recognize those members as enemies. 6 Once war
mobilizes ethnic groups, “the war cannot end until the populations
are separated into defensible, mostly homogenous regions.” 7 Those
advocating for ethno-sectarian division believe that the restoration of
civil politics cannot occur unless the groups are separated into
defensible, ethnically-determined enclaves. They argue that that
solution designed to avoid population transfers, such as powersharing or state re-building, are insufficient in and of themselves to
resolve the security dilemma. 8
Chaim Kaufmann, a staunch proponent of ethno-sectarian
partition, defines partition as a separation “jointly decided upon by
the responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides (and not
under pressure of imminent military victory by one side), or imposed
on both sides by a stronger third party.” 9 Ethno-sectarian division
may be accomplished either by partitioning a state into smaller ethnic
based states, or through the creation of a loose federal or confederal
structure based upon ethnically defined provinces. 10 The general idea
behind ethno-sectarian partition is that if ethno-sectarian groups

Spring 1993, at 27, 29 (suggesting that the security dilemma is intensified when
the opponents belong to different ethnic groups).
6. Nicholas Sambanis, Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical
Critique of the Theoretical Literature, in LIVING TOGETHER AFTER ETHNIC
KILLING: EXPLORING THE CHAIM KAUFMANN ARGUMENT 41, 42 (Roy Licklider &
Mia Bloom eds., 2007) [hereinafter Sambanis, Partition as a Solution to Ethnic
War] (citing Chaim Kaufmann, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil
Wars, INT’L SECURITY, Spring 1996, at 136, 150 [hereinafter Kaufmann, Possible
and Impossible Solutions]) (summarizing and analyzing Chaim Kaufmann’s
hypotheses about ethnic interaction during war times and the security dilemma).
7. Kaufmann, Possible and Impossible Solutions, supra note 6, at 150.
8. Sambanis, Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War, supra note 6, at 42.
9. Chaim D. Kaufmann, When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers
and Partitions in the Twentieth Century, INT’L SECURITY, Fall 1998, at 120, 125
n.12.
10. Nicole B. Herther-Spiro, Comment, Can Ethnic Federalism Prevent
“Recourse to Rebellion?” A Comparative Analysis of the Ethiopian and Iraqi
Constitutional Structures, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 321, 330 (2007) (proposing
that ethno-sectarian divisions as the basis for political units stems from the desire
to group already cohesive community units together to increase the chances of
creating a functioning governmental unit).
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cannot live together in a heterogeneous state, then it is better to form
multiple homogeneous states or provinces. 11

II. CALLS FOR THE ETHNO-SECTARIAN
DIVISION OF IRAQ
Those calling for the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq are the
dominant voice in the current discourse surrounding the political
future of Iraq. 12 Their argument begins with the belief that “Iraq is
deeply divided along ethnic and sectarian lines.” 13 For them, Iraq has
three separate and distinct ethno-sectarian communities, namely
Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurd. 14 In analyzing this position, Toby Dodge, a
Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, describes their rationale as follows:
[t]hese communities, it is claimed, are largely geographically
homogenous and mutually hostile. They have been locked in
an artificial, Sunni-dominated state for eighty-five years. This
analysis leads its promoters to view the post-Saddam civil
war as tragic but largely unavoidable. This approach asserts
that Iraqi politics has always been and will continue to be
animated by deeply held communal antipathies; the civil war
is simply an outcome of this. From this perspective, there can
only be one policy option: the situation will be stabilized by
dividing the country into three smaller, ethnically purer and
more manageable units. 15

11. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 588 (2d ed., 2000);
see also AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 44-47 (1977).
12. See, e.g., JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2; Leslie H. Gelb, Op-Ed.,
Divide Iraq into Three States, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 26, 2003, at 8; Peter W.
Galbraith, How to Get Out of Iraq, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 13, 2004, at 42
[hereinafter Galbraith, How to Get Out of Iraq].
13. DAVID L. PHILLIPS, LOSING IRAQ: INSIDE THE POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION
FIASCO 237 (Westview Press 2005).
14. See id.; Gelb, supra note 12, at 8 (implying that the fact that the three
ethnic groups do not already exist as one country is a matter of historical accident);
Galbraith, How to Get Out of Iraq, supra note 12, at 45 (describing the varying
desires of the three predominant ethnic groups).
15. Toby Dodge, State Collapse and the Rise of Identity Politics, in IRAQ:
PREVENTING A NEW GENERATION OF CONFLICT 23, 25 (Markus E. Bouillon, David
M. Malone & Ben Roswell eds., 2007) [hereinafter Dodge, State Collapse].
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It is only upon the nature of the smaller, ethnically purer and more
manageable units that those arguing for ethno-sectarian division
differ. Generally speaking, ethno-partitionists call for the creation of
highly autonomous or independent units, which exercise the powers
of self-government, 16 while ethno-federalists advocate for a federal
structure built upon ethnically based regions with an overlay of a
central government with limited power and authority. 17
A number of prominent commentators have called for the ethnosectarian division of Iraq, 18 and at least two detailed, published plans
for the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq have been put forward.
Common to both these plans is an explicit deviation from the present
political structure as set forth in the Iraqi Constitution.
At the forefront of the debate is the Biden-Gelb Plan. In the spring
of 2006, U.S. Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. and President Emeritus of
the Council on Foreign Relations Leslie H. Gelb co-authored a plan
aimed at resolving the increasing violence and hardening political
stalemate in Iraq by shaping an Iraqi federal structure along ethnosectarian lines. 19
16. See, e.g., Gelb, supra note 12, at 8 (“The only viable strategy, then, may be
to . . . move in stages toward a three-state solution: Kurds in the north, Sunnis in
the center and Shiites in the south.”).
17. See, e.g., Joseph R. Biden Jr. & Leslie H. Gelb, Op-Ed., Unity Through
Autonomy in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2006, at A19 (advocating the division of
Iraq into three autonomous regions with responsibility for domestic law,
administration, and security while the central government retains control over
defense of its borders, foreign affairs, and revenue from oil).
18. See, e.g., Alexander B. Downes, More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as
a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars, 27 SAIS REV. 49, 58-59 (2006) (characterizing a
partitioning of Iraq into three regions as inevitable); Peter W. Galbraith, Op-Ed.,
Our Corner of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2006, at A19 [hereinafter Galbraith, Our
Corner] (advocating the creation of Sunni and Shi’a regions in Iraq and the
withdrawal of U.S. troops except a small force that could be left behind in
Kurdistan to prevent al-Qaeda’s surge in power in Iraq); Simon Jenkins, Op-Ed.,
The Fantasy is Over, We Must Partition Iraq and Get Out Now, SUNDAY TIMES
(LONDON), May 21, 2006, at 16 (advocating the governorates’ unification into
Sunni and Shi’a regions under Chapter 5 of the Iraq Constitution); Catherine
Larkin, Talabani Supports Proposal to Divide Iraq into Three Regions,
Oct.
7,
2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
BLOOMBERG,
=newsarchive&sid=aYraIgKc_A50 (noting that Iraqi President Jalal Talabani
supported Biden’s plan for federalism in Iraq).
19. See JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., IRAQ: A WAY FORWARD (2006), available at
http://americancentristparty.net/PDF/planforiraq.pdf (summarizing the Biden-Gelb
plan).
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The core of the Biden-Gelb plan is to replace the current
governorate system with three distinct ethno-sectarian regions—one
Sunni, one Shi’a and one Kurdish 20 —and create a mechanism to
share Iraqi oil proceeds among the three regions. 21 The plan further
calls for the United States, in conjunction with the United Nations, to
convene an international conference to engage Iraq’s neighbors 22 and
for a framework for reducing U.S. forces in the region. 23 Lastly, the
plan envisions the allocation of additional funds to assist in
reconstruction and to establish a jobs program to offer Iraqi youth an
alternative to the militias that remain prevalent in Iraq. 24
In June 2007, using the Biden-Gelb plan as his template, Senator
Biden, in conjunction with Senators Brownback, Boxer, Smith,
Nelson, and Hutchison, sponsored a bi-partisan resolution supporting
a political settlement among Iraq’s “major factions.” 25 The resolution
passed the Senate on September 26, 2007 with seventy-five votes in
support. 26 Representative Gallegly sponsored an identical resolution
in the House of Representatives. 27 Biden’s colleague and co-sponsor
of the Senate bill, Senator Sam Brownback, clarified that the “major
factions” referenced in the bill were the three “main ethno-sectarian
groups” of Iraq: the Shi’a, the Kurds, and the Sunnis. 28 According to

20. Id. at 2 (stating that the plan seeks to “[p]ut the central government in
charge of truly common interests: border defense, foreign policy, oil production
and revenues [and] [f]orm regional governments . . . responsible for administering
their own regions”).
21. See id. (recommending that U.S. policymakers push to for an “agreement
for the federal solution from the Sunni Arabs by guaranteeing them 20 percent of
all present and future oil revenues - an amount roughly proportional to their size which would make their region economically viable”).
22. See id. (suggesting that the U.S. should work to have Iraq’s neighbors
“pledge to support Iraq’s power sharing agreement and respect Iraq’s borders”).
23. See id. (positing the need for only a residual force of as few as 20,000 in a
very short time-frame).
24. See id.
25. S. Con. Res. 37, 110th Cong. (2007) (advocating for a federal structure to
implement a political settlement). Representative Gallegly sponsored an identical
resolution in the House of Representatives. H.R. Res. 688, 110th Cong. (2007).
26. See 153 CONG. REC. S12093, 12095 (2007) (roll call vote no. 348).
27. H.R. Res. 688, 110th Cong. (2007).
28. Reidar Visser, The U.S. Senate Votes to Partition Iraq, Softly, HIST. POL.
IMAGINING, Sept. 27, 2007, http://historiae.org/biden.asp [hereinafter Visser, The
U.S. Senate Votes].
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Biden and Gelb, such a division, “may be the only way to prevent a
violent partition . . . and preserve a unified Iraq.” 29
Brookings Institute scholars Edward Joseph and Michael
O’Hanlon developed a second prominent ethno-sectarian divisionist
plan for Iraq (the “Brookings Plan”). The Brookings Plan, authored
in the summer of 2007, sets out the means for implementing a socalled soft ethno-sectarian-based partition. 30 The Brookings Plan
argues that soft ethno-sectarian partition is the lesser of a number of
possible evils, 31 and points to increased ethno-sectarian killings,
political choices, and population movements into homogenous
communities as an indication that Iraqis are leaning more towards
separation than ever before. 32 Even though most Iraqis today still do
not favor soft partition, 33 the Brookings Plan argues, indicators of
Shi’a support for soft partition, along with the on-going sectarian
civil war, mean that ethno-sectarian partition may soon become “the
best option available for Iraq.” 34
A central element of the Brookings Plan is facilitating the
voluntary relocation of populations. 35 The plan proposes dividing the
country into Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish regions, none of which would
be ethnically pure, but would be defined by natural geographic
boundaries as much as possible. 36 The plan advocates dividing major
cities like Baghdad and Mosul along natural boundaries, but with the
goal of minimizing population transfers. 37 Under the Brookings Plan,
the ethno-sectarian division could provide equal distribution of
29. BIDEN, supra note 19, at 3.
30. See generally JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2 (differentiating between
soft partition of the type proposed in the Biden-Gelb plan and hard partition,
involving outright division of Iraq).
31. See id. at 1 (admitting that while partition might not be ideal, the truths
observed on the ground begin to make partition look like a plausible alternative).
32. See id. at 1-3 (describing instances of Iraqis disapproving of rational
alternatives to partition, thus creating the inference that Iraq’s citizens are
accepting the idea of separation).
33. Id. at 2.
34. Id. at 13.
35. See id. at 15 (implying that numerous people feel unsafe but may need help
to move).
36. See id. at 15-16 (explaining that the number of inter-sectarian marriages
alone precludes any possibility of ethnically homogenous regions).
37. See id. at 16 (asserting that the Tigris River embodies a useful demarcation
of different ethnic zones).
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country’s oil wealth, compensation and assistance to all persons
chosing to relocate and protection for minorities in the new regions. 38
In addition to the two plans above, several organizations have
advocated for the ethno-sectarian based “hard partition” of Iraq into
three independent states. In 2006, a number of prominent
commentators predicted that such partition was likely inevitable. 39
Highlighting the Kurdish threat to secede, 40 they claimed the de facto
partition that allegedly already existed provided an irreversible
inertia towards hard partition along ethno-sectarian lines. 41 In the
summer of 2007, the Washington D.C. based think tank Fund for
Peace issued a report considering the merits of a hard partition of
Iraq. 42 The report called for the creation of three independent
political states based on ethno-sectarian lines along with the creation
of a new political order modeled loosely after the European Union. 43

38. Id. at 17.
39. See Patrick Cockburn, Sectarian Break-Up of Iraq is Now Inevitable, Admit
Officials, THE INDEPENDENT, July 24, 2006, at 18 (reporting that members of
Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish parties were examining the possibility of dividing Iraq
along ethnic lines); Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Burdensome Weight of Unity Could
Force Iraq Break-Up, FOXNEWS.COM, Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,214820,00.html (relating that Abdel Aziz Hakim, a prominent Shiite
politician, called for the formation of a Shiite region in southern Iraq similar to
Kurdistan in northern Iraq).
40. See, e.g., Yahya Barsanji, Kurdish Leader Threatens Iraq Secession,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 3, 2006, available at www.institutkurde.org/en/info/
1157362753.html (reporting that the “leader of the Kurdish region in northern Iraq
threatened secession Sunday as a dispute over flying the Iraqi flag intensified”);
Steve Negus, Iraq’s Kurds Threaten Secession Over Oil Rights, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
29, 2006, at 7 (noting that the Kurdish Prime Minister asserted that “[i]f Baghdad
ministers refuse to abide by that constitution, the people of Kurdistan reserve the
right to reconsider our choice” to participate in Iraq’s voluntary union).
41. See, e.g., Vlahos, supra note 39 (noting that Tony Sullivan, director of Near
East Support Services, a defense consulting firm, asserted that “[t]he partitioning is
already in progress in Iraq . . . . What is happening in Iraq, I think, is a movement
into . . . civil war or partitioning”).
42. See generally PAULINE H. BAKER, THE FUND FOR PEACE, A WAY OUT: THE
UNION OF IRAQI STATES (2007), http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/images/pdf/
Iraq-report07full.pdf (attempting to provide systematic analysis of the progress or
lack of progress by using various metrics to measure progress).
43. See id. at 6 (discussing the possibility of a relationship among three
independent Iraqi states with economic, but not political ties).

SIMPSON-WILLIAMS_TO PRINT.DOC

2008]

12/4/2008 12:03:18 PM

RETHINKING THE POLITICAL FUTURE

201

III. THE CASE AGAINST THE ETHNO-SECTARIAN
DIVISION OF IRAQ
The common theme among the above cited proposals is the
division of Iraq along ethno-sectarian lines. Ultimately, regardless of
the mechanism or method by which it is achieved, the ethnosectarian division of Iraq is not the best way forward for Iraqis or the
international community.
In the following analysis, this Article sets out a series of critiques
of the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq. First, and perhaps foremost,
Iraqis oppose the ethno-sectarian division of their country. Next, any
attempt to divide the diverse and heterogeneous modern day Iraq will
result in a cartographic conundrum, as neat ethno-sectarian lines are
nearly impossible to draw. Further, the ethno-sectarian division of
Iraq will not end the violence. The prevalence of inter-sectarian and
non-sectarian based violence, the disintegration of the Iraqi central
government, the alienation and isolation of Iraqi minorities, and the
likelihood of opportunistic or defensive neighbors all suggest the
violence in Iraq will continue. Iraq’s diversity would also necessitate
the forced relocation of thousands of Iraqis that will only compound
the on-going displacement. Historically, the ethno-sectarian division
of states has been a failure. In light of the diversity of the proposed
regions, a constitutionally valid formation of three ethno-sectarian
regions is highly unlikely. Finally, given the successful efforts of the
Iraqi parliament to adopt key pieces of legislation in February
2008, 44 the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq would fail to capitalize
on the emerging political cooperation.

A. IRAQIS OPPOSE ETHNO-SECTARIAN DIVISION
As violence raged in the summer of 2006, seventy-eight percent of
Iraqis opposed the division of Iraq along ethno-sectarian lines. 45
44. See, e.g., Alissa J. Rubin, Ending Impasse, Iraq Parliament Backs
Measurers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, at A1 (noting that Iraqi politicians passed
“three far reaching measures . . . .”).
45. JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 8 n.34 (noting that an International
Republican Institute poll conducted in July 2006 “reported [seventy-eight] percent
of respondents disagreeing with the suggestion that Iraqis should be segregated
according to religion or sect”).
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More recent polling shows that one in six Iraqis believe forcible
separation of people along ethno-sectarian lines had occurred in their
area, 46 and ninety-eight percent of Iraqis polled saw this division as
“a bad thing for Iraq.” 47
Following the passage of Biden’s resolution in the U.S. Senate,
Iraqis voiced near-unanimous opposition. Iraq’s parliamentary
political blocs issued a joint statement criticizing the ethno-sectarian
division as “a threat to Iraq sovereignty and unity . . . based on an
incorrect reading and unrealistic estimations of the history, present
and future of Iraq.” 48 Individual Iraqi leaders also condemned the
resolution, including Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, who
stressed that, “the Iraqi people, government, constitutional
institutions, and civil society organizations” had rejected the ethnosectarian division plan. 49 Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki also
reportedly called the Biden-Gelb plan a “catastrophe.” 50 Further,
Sharwan al-Wa’ili, Iraqi Minister of State for National Security,

46. ABC NEWS/BBC/NHK POLL, SECURITY GAINS REVERSE IRAQ’S SPIRAL
THOUGH SERIOUS PROBLEMS REMAIN 40 (2008), http://abcnews.go.com/images/
PollingUnit/1060a1IRaqWhereThingsStand.pdf [hereinafter 2008 POLL].
47. ABC NEWS/BBC/NHK POLL, IRAQIS’ OWN SURGE ASSESSMENT: FEW SEE
SECURITY GAINS (2007), http://www.abcnews.go.com/images/US/1043a1Iraq
WhereThingsStand.pdf [hereinafter 2007 POLL] (reporting that “separation is
enormously unpopular: ninety-eight percent [of Iraqis], with agreement across
ethnic and sectarian lines, oppose it.”).
48. Stephen Zunes, Support for Iraq Partition: Cynical and Dangerous,
FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4639; see
also Ned Parker & Raheem Salman, A Divided Iraq Unites Against Partition Plan,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007, at A4 (describing the Iraqi politicians reaction to the
Senate resolution as a “rare show of unity,” but one in which they uniformly
“skewered” the proposition); Iraqi TV Channels Carry Reactions to US Senate
Resolution, BBC MONITORING MIDDLE EAST – POLITICAL, Oct. 10, 2007 (stressing
the possibility of a law to ban all possibility of a split of Iraq into multiple entities).
49. Iraqi TV Channels Carry Reactions to US Senate Resolutions, supra
note 48.
50. See, e.g., Mohamed Khodr, Iraq, Iraq, Partitioning Iraq for a Nomination,
MEDIA MONITORS NETWORK, Oct. 15, 2007, http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/
view/full/46672 (asserting that partition “of Iraq is opposed by Iraq’s Prime
Minister Nuri Al Maliki, a Shiite, who called the plan a ‘catastrophe.’ the Iraqi
Parliament, the O.I.C, representing all [fifty-seven] Muslim nations (Organization
of Islamic Conferences), the Arab League, [and] the Gulf Cooperation Council
(includes Saudi Arabia)”).
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called on Iraq and the world to “denounce it as a disastrous
resolution.” 51
The Arab media also condemned the proposal for the ethnosectarian division of Iraq. 52 Rejection of Biden’s resolution “filled
editorial pages across the Arab world, and has widely been
interpreted as an imperialistic attempt to decide both Iraq’s and the
region’s fate.” 53 Iraqi and other Arab editorials voiced strong support
for federalism, but opposed strongly the idea of ethno-sectarian
division. 54
Even supporters of the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq recognize
that it is not a viable plan without the support of Iraq’s Sunni Arab
population. According to the authors of the Brookings Plan, “Iraq’s
Sunni Arabs bitterly and categorically reject” their version of ethnosectarian division, adding that it is hard to find “any initial support”
among Sunnis, and ultimately concluding that “winning Sunni Arab
acquiescence for such a plan—without which it could not be safely
implemented—will be difficult.”55

B. A CARTOGRAPHIC CONUNDRUM
The perception of an already divided Iraq of three ethnic
communities motivates many of those who argue for a formal ethnosectarian division. 56 To describe Iraq as divided into three easily
51. Iraq Minister in al-Hayah Rejects US Senate Resolution, BBC
MONITORING MIDDLE EAST – POLITICAL, Oct. 3, 2007.
52. See Trudy Rubin, Why a Plan for Iraq’s Soft Partition Would Backfire,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 3, 2007, at A15 (relating a conversation the author had with
the Iraqi Foreign Minister and the general uproar over the resolution).
53. Kathleen Ridolfo, Criticism of U.S. Senate’s Partition Resolution Echoes
Across Arab World, RADIO FREE EUROPE: RADIO LIBERTY, Oct. 4, 2007,
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/10/770D037B-73B3-45F2-91BB-2456A7
AE8318.html.
54. See, e.g., BBC Monitoring Weekly Roundup of Iraqi Press 26 Sep to 02
Oct. 07, BBC MONITORING MIDDLE EAST – POLITICAL, Oct. 2, 2007; see also
Iraq’s Al-Bayyinah Editorial Censures US Senate’s Partition Resolution, BBC
MONITORING MIDDLE EAST – POLITICAL, Oct. 4, 2007; Kuwaiti Emir Warns
Against Iraq Partition, US-Iranian Friction, BBC MONITORING MIDDLE EAST –
POLITICAL, Oct. 3, 2007; Saudi Editorial Warns Against Partitioning Iraq, BBC
MONITORING MIDDLE EAST – POLITICAL, Oct. 20, 2006.
55. JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 10.
56. See BIDEN, supra note 19, at 2 (calling for the division of Iraq into three
regions: Shi’a, Sunni and Kurd).
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demarcated, mutually hostile communities, however, is a “static
caricature that does great damage to a complex, historically
grounded, reality.” 57 The intensity of ethno-sectarian tension that
exists in Iraq today is a recent development, feeding largely on the
security void left by the dismantlement of Saddam Hussein’s regime
and the initial inability to create an effective central government. 58
Further, the prevalence of diverse and multi-ethnic cities makes
dividing those cities along ethno-sectarian lines unfeasible. 59 Finally,
massive relocations of Iraqis, when combined with a census over ten
years old, makes determining exactly where individuals live for
purposes of dividing the state impossible. 60
1. Complex Identities
The reality of Iraqi identity is rooted in a complex history, and not
simply upon ethno-sectarian characteristics.61 Historically, Iraq’s
57. Dodge, State Collapse, supra note 15, at 25; see also Reidar Visser,
Centralism and Unitary State Logic in Iraq from Midhat Pasha to Jawad alMaliki: A Continuous Trend?, HIST. POL. IMAGINING, Apr. 22, 2006,
http://www.historiae.org/Maliki.asp [hereinafter Visser, Centralism and Unitary
State Logic] (explaining that while the “unitary state model” was created
artificially by the British, nevertheless it was a philosophy and organization that
quickly found wide-spread support within the population, with the exception of the
Kurds); Gary Bass, Breaking up (a Country) is Hard to Do, WASH. POST, Aug. 27,
2006, at B3 (relating that many respected experts are very skeptical of the idea that
a partition would create homogenous and stable regions); Aaron S. Klieman, The
Resolution of Conflicts Through Territorial Partition: The Palestine Experience,
22 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y HIST. 281, 291 (1980) (postulating whether partition results
in short-term security but necessarily leads to long-term fighting and strife); Thom
Shanker, Divided they Stand, but on Graves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, at WK1
(revealing the probable necessity of a large peace-keeping presence for years to
come to maintain any proposed partition).
58. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Buried Bomb Kills 5 G.I.’s in Baghdad
Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at A3 (describing the Iraqi government
as “disastrously ineffective”).
59. See GARETH STANSFIELD, IRAQ: PEOPLE, HISTORY, POLITICS 57 (2007)
(discussing the deep-rooted divide between Sunni and Shi’a).
60. See SAMEER N. YACOUB, Iraq Plans to Conduct General Census Next Year,
Associated Press, June 10, 2008, available at http://wiredispatch.com/news/
?id=205701 (noting that Iraq’s last census, conducted in 1997, did not include
several northern Kurdish provinces).
61. See generally WILLIAM R. POLK, UNDERSTANDING IRAQ (2005) (tracing the
history of Iraq from ancient times through modern occupations to demonstrate the
difficulties that the United States may face by ignoring Iraq’s complex history);
CHARLES TRIPP, A HISTORY OF IRAQ (2000) (developing the modern political
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social classes were complex and differentiable along lines of
property ownership, income, and political influence in addition to
ethnicity, religion, and sectarianism. 62 According to Reidar Visser, a
research fellow at the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs,
“[t]o many Iraqis, the ethno-religious community is but one of
several possible foci of identity . . . . Instead, villages, towns and
regions have shaped identities.” 63 Similarly, Laith Kubba, former
spokesman for the Iraqi Prime Minister, has highlighted the historical
lack of inter-communal tension among Iraqis, 64 and even some
ethno-partitionists acknowledge the recency of the sectarian divide. 65
One prominent historian of modern Iraq has also suggested that the
sectarian violence and population displacement “is taking place for
the first time in Iraq’s modern history.” 66

history of Iraq and discussing the evolution of relations among Iraqi ethnic
groups); TOBY DODGE, INVENTING IRAQ: THE FAILURE OF NATION-BUILDING AND
A HISTORY DENIED (2005) (outlining the development of Iraqi government from
the British occupation to the U.S. invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein and
suggesting that Iraq’s occupiers have often ignored Iraq’s history).
62. See generally HANNA BATATU, THE OLD SOCIAL CLASSES AND THE
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS OF IRAQ 6-7 (2004) (discussing the varying
categories that make up the definition of “class” in the context of Iraq).
63. AN IRAQ OF ITS REGIONS 2 (Visser & Stansfield eds., 2008) [hereinafter
Visser & Stansfield]; see also Public International Law & Policy Group & The
Century Foundation, Establishing a Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure in
Iraq: Some Basic Considerations, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 53, 69 (2003) [hereinafter
Establishing a Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure] (indicating that Iraqi
Shi’a more often identify with their Arab culture rather than their Shi’a sectarian
group, as evidenced by their fighting alongside their fellow Sunni Arabs in the
Iran/Iraq war and against the Persian Shi’a of Iran).
64. Laith Kubba, Senior Dir. for the Middle East and North Africa, Nat’l
Endowment for Democracy, Remarks at the American University International
Law Review and Public International Law and Policy Group Symposium,
Rethinking the Future: The Next Five Years in Iraq (Feb. 11, 2008) (transcript on
file with the American University International Law Review).
65. See David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Road to Partition, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
2007, at A27 (describing the sectarian divide through the eyes of an Iraqi
politician: “there is a wall in her mind separating Sunnis from Shi’a, a wall that
was erected during Saddam’s persecution and that has been fortified by the
violence since.”).
66. Phebe Marr, Iraq’s Identity Crisis, in IRAQ: PREVENTING A NEW
GENERATION OF CONFLICT 45 (Markus E. Boullion, David M. Malone & Ben
Roswell eds., 2007) (blaming the overlap of a variety of fears, including loss of
jobs and violence, for the sectarian divide).
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Much of this recent rise in ethno-sectarian tension is attributable to
the security vacuum that followed the collapse of the Saddam
Hussein regime. 67 When central state authority crumbles, individuals
are freed from institutional restraints and lose the protection
normally supplied by public offices. 68 Thus, in response, they often
seek safety, profit, or both. 69 Once the state’s capacity is removed, its
ability to influence is reduced greatly, and ultimately “[p]eople will
look to whatever grouping, militia, or identity offers them the best
chance of survival in times of profound uncertainty.” 70 Often offering
hope are “ethnic entrepreneurs” who mobilize significant portions of
the population on the basis of communalistic identity: “[p]reviously
‘fuzzy’ or secondary identity traits become politicized and
‘enumerated.’ The struggle to survive, to gain a degree of
predictability for yourself and your family, then becomes obtainable
primarily through the increasingly militant deployment of ethnic or
sectarian identity.” 71 Thus, the lack of institutional and coercive
national government authority is a significant cause of the recent rise
of ethno-sectarian tension in Iraq as Iraqis starving for protection
turn to the only organizations that appear to offer it: groups
organized along ethno-sectarian lines.

67. See Ayad Rahim, Attitudes to the West, Arabs, and Fellow Iraqis, in IRAQ
SINCE THE GULF WAR: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY 189-91 (Fran Hazelton ed.,
1994) (citing a “ rising resentment and growing rift between Sunni Arabs and the
rest of the population” fostered by the Hussein regime, Rahim states that Iraqis
began retreating into particular clans or sects because they feared they could trust
no one but close family members).
68. See Nelson Kasfir, Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent
Predation: Causes of Failure, in WHEN STATES FAIL: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 54-55 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2004).
69. Id. at 55.
70. See Dodge, State Collapse, supra note 15, at 26; see also Daniel N. Posner,
Civil Society and the Reconstruction of Failed States, in WHEN STATES FAIL:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 237, 240-41 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2004) (observing
that when the public order is in disarray, people’s concern turns toward survival);
Andrea Kathryn Talentino, The Two Faces of Nation Building: Developing
Function and Identity, 17 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 557, 569 (2004)
(examining experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo, and concluding that when a state
begins to disintegrate, the organizations at the local level are reinforced and
creating a culture in which exclusion is favored).
71. Dodge, State Collapse, supra note 15, at 27.
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2. Urban Areas
Even if ethnic identities were paramount, the diversity of the
heavily populated major urban areas will ultimately result in sixtyseven percent of the Iraqi population falling outside of any
conceivable ethno-sectarian divisionist plan. 72 With nearly forty
percent of Iraqis living in the multiethnic cities of Baghdad and
Mosul alone, dividing these cities, as well as Iraq’s other major
urban centers, may well be impossible. 73 The division of major urban
centers has historically been difficult, 74 and there is no reason to
expect that a contemporary division would be any less so. Given the
challenge inherent in dividing Iraq’s major cities along ethnic lines,
most calling for the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq have proposed
exceptions to their plans ranging from administering Baghdad as an
international city, 75 to allowing it to form its own region 76 (despite
the Constitution’s prohibiting Baghdad from joining any region).77
Regardless, any ethno-sectarian divisionist plan would require
exception of some sort for major urban areas. With such exceptions
swallowing the rule, it is reasonable to challenge the rule.
3. Who Lives Where?
Finally, the last official Iraqi census was more than ten years
ago. 78 Coupled with the thousands of undocumented Iraqi casualties
since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, 79 the two million or so
72. See UNICEF, IRAQ: STATISTICS, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/
iraq_statistics.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2008) (stating that sixty-seven percent of
the population lives in urban areas).
73. Anthony Cordesman, Op-Ed., Three Iraqs Would be One Big Problem,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2006, at A27.
74. See id. (“We have seen in Northern Ireland and the Balkans how difficult it
is to split cities . . . .”).
75. See BIDEN, supra note 19.
76. JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 16.
77. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 120.
78. See Press Briefing, United Nations Statistics Division, Press Briefing on
Iraq Demographics (Aug. 8, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/
docs/2003/iraqdemobrf.doc.htm (explaining that the 1997 Iraqi census data is
inaccurate because it excluded the three Kurdish governorates); see also
Cordesman, supra note 73, at A27 (“There has never been a meaningful census of
Iraq showing exactly how its Arab Sunnis, Arab Shi’a, Kurds and other factions
are divided or where they live.”).
79. Compare IRAQ BODY COUNT HOME PAGE, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/
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displaced Iraqis, 80 the impossibility of determining where Iraqis live
for purposes of drawing ethno-sectarian lines becomes apparent.
Without knowing where Iraqis live, no one can precisely determine
which ethno-sectarian groups dominate which areas, thus making
implementation of a plan to divide Iraq along ethno-sectarian lines
essentially impossible.

C. ETHNO-SECTARIAN DIVISION
WILL NOT END THE VIOLENCE
The ethno-sectarian division of Iraq will not end the violence.81
Those advocating for ethno-sectarian division fail to account for the
extensive non-ethno-sectarian motivated violence. 82 The isolation of
minorities following an ethno-sectarian division will present
increased danger for residual minorities. Neighboring states and
interested parties may either be threatened by the consolidation of

(last visited Sept. 15, 2008) (estimating that up to 90,000 documented civilians
have died in Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion began in 2003), with Gilbert Burnham
et al., Mortality after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample
Survey, 368 THE LANCET 1421 (2006) (estimating that approximately 655,000
more Iraqi civilians have died than would otherwise have died if the U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq had not occurred).
80. See UNITED NATIONS REFUGEE AGENCY [UNHCR], IRAQ SITUATION
RESPONSE: UPDATE ON REVISED ACTIVITIES UNDER THE JANUARY 2007
SUPPLEMENTARY APPEAL 1 (2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/partner/
PARTNERS/469632e32.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR, IRAQ SITUATION RESPONSE]
(noting that of the two million internally displaced Iraqis, many were displaced
under Saddam Hussein’s regime).
81. See Sambanis, Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War, supra note 6, at 84-85
(concluding that separating ethnic groups does not resolve the problem of violent
ethnic antagonism). In fact, Sambanis puts forth a rival hypothesis: “if borders can
be credibly and securely redrawn, then combining several large ethnic groups in a
larger, multi-ethnic state may reduce the probability of new wars.” Id. at 84; see
also JAMES A. BAKER, III ET AL., IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT 31 (2006),
available at http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/iraq_
study_group_report.pdf (postulating that not only will the ethnic-division of Iraq
not end the violence, it is only likely to make the situation worse); Rend Al-Rahim,
Op-Ed., Partition is Not the Solution . . ., WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2006, at B7
(analogizing a potential partition of Iraq with the problems facing India and
Pakistan over the Kashmir region and concluding that the ethno-sectarian division
of Iraq will not end ethnic violence but will likely lead to further conflict over
greater power and control of resources and regions along the partition lines).
82. BAKER, supra note 81, at 10-11 (describing the multiple groups responsible
for violence in Iraq, including jihadist groups and organized crime).

SIMPSON-WILLIAMS_TO PRINT.DOC

2008]

12/4/2008 12:03:18 PM

RETHINKING THE POLITICAL FUTURE

209

ethno-sectarian groups in Iraq, or may try to exploit it to their
advantage.
1. Non-Ethno-Sectarian Motivated Violence
The radical decentralization of power along ethno-sectarian lines
presents the distinct danger of instigating a violent struggle for
supremacy among already warring intra-sectarian factions. 83 Further,
much of the violence occurring in Iraq today stems from profiteers
masquerading as sectarian fighters, and the ethno-sectarian division
of Iraq will do nothing to quash their activities. 84
The predominant Iraqi ethno-sectarian groups are far from
homogeneous or monolithic. Illustrations of intra-sectarian discord
are readily available, as “intense political rivalries that include armed
conflict, historical variables, and cultural and economic differences”
make the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq a considerable challenge. 85
In February 2008, in the Sunni dominated al-Anbar province, Sunni
tribal blocs forming the al-Anbar Salvation Council demanded that
the Islamic Party (also Sunni) close its headquarters, “threatening ‘to
declare war’ and to use force against the party if the party does not
meet these demands within one month.” 86 In the predominantly Shi’a
part of Southern Iraq, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)
and Sadr movements are locked in a bloody power struggle, with
Diwaniya, Basra, Nasriya, Samawa and many other cities witnessing
“armed conflict, assassinations, and bombings attributable to the
rivalry between the two factions.” 87 Demonstrating Sadrists accused
rival Shi’a, which control Iraqi security forces, of engineering raids
and detentions by U.S. and Iraqi forces to prevent them from
mounting an effective campaign against their rival Shi’a parties for
83. See Dodge, State Collapse, supra note 15, at 33 (wondering if many
reverse cause with effect, associating the increased violence with ethno-sectarian
differences, rather than the increased instability and violence resulting in more
ethno-sectarian distrust).
84. Id.
85. REND AL-RAHIM FRANCKE, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE,
POLITICAL PROGRESS IN IRAQ DURING THE SURGE 16 (2007), available at
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr196.pdf.
86. Muhammad Yousef, Sunni Internal Conflicts in al-Anbar, NIQASH, Feb. 24,
2008, http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=266&id=2161 (last
visited Sept. 5, 2008).
87. FRANCKE, supra note 85, at 15.
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the upcoming provincial elections. 88 Some fear that the ethnosectarian division of Iraq would lead to a fierce battle for control
between the Badr Brigade and Muqtada al-Sadr for the Shi’a region
in the south. 89
The Kurds have also experienced internal fighting, both within
Iraq and among Kurdish populations in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. 90 In
Iraq, rival Kurdish factions often have conflicted or cooperated based
on their political objectives. 91 In 1975, the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP) split, and Jalal Talabani formed the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK). 92 During the Hussein Regime’s Anfal campaign
against the Kurds in the late 1980s, the two parties cooperated to
resist the Iraqi government. 93 When Hussein’s control of the region
weakened and the Kurdistan Regional Government formed, the
parties again began fighting, often violently, to assert their presence
in the region. 94 To be fair, however, the Kurds in Iraq have taken
88. See, e.g., Institute for War & Peace Reporting, Sadrists Fight On in Basra,
Mar. 28, 2008, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=icr&s=f&o=343673&apc_state=henpicr
(last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
89. See, e.g., Interview by Foreign Policy with Dr. Toby Dodge, Reader in
International Politics, Queen Mary University of London (Sept. 7, 2007), available
at www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3982&page=1 [hereinafter
Seven Questions] (purporting that there “is a low-level civil war between the two
main Shi’a parties led by members of the Badr Brigade and al-Sadr” and partition
would greatly inflame these tensions).
90. See Martin van Bruinessen, The Kurds Between Iran and Iraq, MIDDLE E.
REP., July-Aug. 1986, at 14 (listing many of the conflicting Kurdish groups both
within and outside Iraq, including the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party, which
clashed with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran and which helped the Iranian
government drive Iranian Kurds out of areas near the Turkish border).
91. See generally id. (discussing internal conflict as a hindrance to the Iraqi
Kurdish nationalist movement).
92. See Theodore McLauclin, Self-Interest and the National Idea in Iraqi
Kurdish Politics, 1978-2003, 13 (Feb. 28, 2007) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the American University International Law Review) (citing GARETH
STANSFIELD, IRAQI KURDISTAN: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND EMERGENT
DEMOCRACY 83-85 (RoutledgeCurzon 2003)) (explaining that the KDP consisted
mostly of tribal leaders, while the PUK comprised “urban socialists”).
93. See DAVID MCDOWALL, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE KURDS 368-83 (3d
ed. 2004) (discussing the cooperation of Barzani, of the KDP, and Talabani, of the
PUK, under the Kurdistan Front to oppose the Iraqi Government’s oppression of
the Kurds and to negotiate the creation of the Kurdistan Regional Government).
94. See INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE: A GLOBAL SURVEY 171-74 (2d ed.
2002) (suggesting that Kurdish infighting has led to the displacement of Kurds));
see also McLauchlin, supra note 92, at 14-27 (discussing all of the periods of
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greater strides than any of the other groups toward intra-sectarian
cooperation. Despite their often violent history, in January of 2006
the two main Kurdish parties reached a power sharing agreement that
fostered greater unity in the Kurdish region. 95
Additionally, profiteers disguised as ethno-sectarian fighters are
responsible for far more of the violence in Iraq than most Westerners
appreciate. According to Rend Al-Rahim, Senior Fellow at the
United States Institute of Peace:
[v]iolence in neighborhoods now includes family vendettas
avenging former murders and assassinations or revenge
killing of former Baathists accused of criminality under the
previous regime. The skein of violence is further tangled by
the proliferation of gangs that are mini-mafias masquerading
as sectarian or political militias. These groups are only
interested in profit, and they engage in the lucrative trade of
killing or evicting residents, looting their homes, and renting
the houses to new residents. 96
For instance, Sadr’s Mahdi Army continues to exploit their fellow
Shi’a in Sadr-dominated territory, gaining control of real-estate and
businesses to turn a profit. 97 Other rogue militias, claiming to be
affiliated with Sadr, carry out exploitation and “thuggery” for
personal gain. 98 The lack of effective governing and security
structures in Iraq is resulting in Iraq’s “‘breaking down’—not into
cohesive territorial units based on ethnic and sectarian identities—
conflict and cooperation among the KDP and the PUK from 1975 to 2003 and
noting that by 1996, the tensions between the KDP and PUK had escalated to open
war, with each party using force, sometimes in the form of tanks, to seize the other
party’s stronghold positions.
95. Kathleen Ridolfo, Iraq: Kurds Agree to Unify Administrations, RADIO FREE
EUROPE: RADIO LIBERTY, Jan. 12, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/
2006/01/9d8fcdd7-2da3-4035-b63c-7676f7819b24.html.
96. FRANCKE, supra note 85, at 3-4.
97. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, IRAQ’S CIVIL WAR, THE SADRISTS AND THE
SURGE, i (2008), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?
lng=en&id=48011 (underscoring the increasing ruthlessness of the Sadrists as they
continued to increase their wealth).
98. See id.; see also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
(UNHCR), COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION: IRAQ 14 (2005), available at
http:www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/435637914.pdf
[hereinafter
UNHCR,
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION] (indicating that kidnapping and hostage taking
is prevalent, and that the kidnappers often ask for money).
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but into fiefdoms controlled by militias, political parties, and
shadowy local figures.” 99 Thus one reason for the apparent
prominence of ethno-sectarian identity is profit. Iraqi’s are saying,
“‘I’m not joining for ideological reasons, but I cannot feed my family
any other way, and here people are offering money and cash.’” 100
None of this is to say that ethno-sectarian motivated fighting does
not exist in Iraq, for it surely does. But rather, in addition to the
sectarian fighting, extensive fighting within and regardless of ethnosectarian groups exists, and as a result, the ethno-sectarian division
of Iraq is not sufficiently tailored to the source of violence. Though
significant numbers of Iraqis report being forcefully displaced, 101 the
vast majority of people in all but a few ethnic groups felt that they
were targeted for reasons other than their ethnicity. 102
2. The Not-So-Minor Affect on Minorities
The ethno-sectarian division of Iraq may condemn residual
minorities to discrimination and second-class citizenship and
possibly instigate violent instability.103 One empirical work studied
the relationship between ethnicity and political violence and
concluded that the highest propensity for ethnic violence exists at
extreme polarization; i.e. the highest risk zone for violent conflict
exists “when an ethnic bloc may be sufficient in size to permanently
exclude others from the exercises of power.” 104 Robert Jervis has
99. Marr, supra note 66, at 53.
100. CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS & HEINRICH BÖLL FOUNDATION, IRAQ’S
DISPLACEMENT CRISIS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 19 (2008), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/02/pdf/iraq_refugees.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 3, 2008).
101. 2007 POLL, supra note 47, at 30.
102. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION IN IRAQ, IOM
EMERGENCY NEEDS ASSESSMENTS: POST FEBRUARY 2006 DISPLACEMENT IN IRAQ
3 (2008), available at http:// http://www.iom-iraq.net/library.html#iomIraq (follow
hyperlink for 15 March 2008 report).
103. Andreas Wimmer, Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq,
SURVIVAL, Winter 2003-04, at 111, 125 (hypothesizing that “ethnic cleansings and
forced resettlements will continue” and that the less well established sects, such as
Christians and Turkmen, will experience discrimination perpetrated by local
government).
104. ROBERT H. BATES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, ETHNICITY, CAPITAL FORMATION, AND CONFLICT 28 (1999),
available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/pdf/027.pdf.
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also noted that in most modern civil conflicts both security and
predatory motives exist. 105 The ethno-sectarian division of Iraq may
thus exacerbate the predatory motives of majority populations
against residual minorities. 106 If areas were formed around Shi’a,
Sunni, and Kurdish populations, the minority populations located
within those newly formed areas may have to conform to the ethnic
and cultural persuasions of the area. The ethno-sectarian division of
Iraq would prove even more problematic for nomadic minority
groups or those dispersed across multiple areas. 107
3. The Spillover Effect
The Iraq Study Group suggested the ethno-sectarian division of
Iraq may encourage ethnic fighting elsewhere in the Middle East. 108
Indeed, Arab states have already denounced plans for ethno-sectarian
division as proffering an unacceptable threat to both Iraq and the
region. 109 Rend Francke voiced a similar concern in her public
commentary, arguing that neighboring states with an interest at stake
may intervene directly or increase their support to Iraqi factions. 110
At the very least, increased discord among Iraq’s neighbors will do
little to alleviate the existing tension.
For instance, Turkey and Iran have significant Kurdish regions,
and increased Kurdish autonomy may create greater tension with
their own Kurdish populations. 111 According to Donald Horowitz,
105. Sambanis, Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War, supra note 6, at 45.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Wimmer, supra note 103, at 125 (underscoring the plight of the
“smaller, dispersed minorities” unless strong federal power implements minority
rights which are in turn upheld by a reliable judiciary).
108. BAKER, supra note 81, at 31.
109. See Saudi Editorial Warns Against Partitioning Iraq, supra note 54
(declaring the “illusions of partition . . . [as] an escape from national responsibility
and a retreat to delusions”); see also Kuwaiti Emir Warns Against Iraq Partition,
supra note 54 (reporting the warnings of Kuwaiti Emir Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad Al
Sabah, that partitioning Iraq could endanger both Kuwait and the rest of the Middle
East).
110. Al-Rahim, supra note 81 (predicting that Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Saudi
Arabia would all intervene if partition occurred).
111. See Gretel Kovach, War Pushes Turk-Kurd Tension to Breaking Point,
PAC. NEWS SERV., Mar. 20, 2003, http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_
article.html?article_id=e0b81f415ecf72e790c34f36d9a4829a (adding that “Turkey
has said it will invade if Iraqi Kurds attempt to form their own state); see also
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“Turkey resents support by Iraqi Kurds for the Kurdish rebellion in
southeastern Turkey. The Turks could not, under any conditions,
tolerate an independent Iraqi Kurdistan, which would be a beacon for
its own Kurds.” 112 The Iraq-Turkey border has already witnessed a
significant build up of Turkish troops, and Turkey has promised to
retaliate against any showing of independence by Turkish Kurds. 113
Further, Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian concerns intensified after
significant recent events affecting the greater Kurdish community,
including extensive rioting by Iranian Kurds following the enactment
of Iraq’s Transitional Administrative Law (“TAL”), 114 the end of
PKK’s cease-fire, 115 disturbances in Kurdish-populated areas of
Syria, 116 and the increase in violence in southeastern Turkey. 117
A look at the Sunni dominated areas suggests that ethno-sectarian
division would only increase the dominance of Sunni Islamist
extremist groups over the Sunni insurgents and average Iraqis. 118 If
average Iraqi Sunnis are left without oil money (a foreseeable
consequence of the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq), Arab Sunni
Michael Knights, The Three-Way Game: Iran, Iraq, and the United States, WASH.
INST. FOR NEAR E. POL’Y, June 21, 2005, http://www.washingtoninstitute
.org/templateC05.php?CID=2345 (noting that the tension would expand to the
relationship between Baghdad and Tehran).
112. Donald Horowitz, Unifying Iraq: Partition is the Path to More War—
Multiple Wars, in Fact, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2007, at A16 [hereinafter Horowitz,
Unifying Iraq].
113. Id. (adding that Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds currently experience flourishing
commercial relations which would be undone in a flash and would likely lead to a
“war between two allies.”); Cordesman, supra note 73, at A27 (stating that
“Turkey, Iran and Syria would seek to destabilize the north and exploit the
divisions between the two main Kurdish political unions.”).
114. Gary Thomas, Protests Erupt in Kurdish Areas of Iran,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
2005/iran-050805-25bd3f42.htm (explaining that Iranian Kurds were upset that
Iraqi Kurds were getting rights that they desired).
115. Jonny Dymond, Kurds Move to End Turkish Truce, BBC NEWS, May 29,
2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3760285.stm.
116. Bill Park, Iraq’s Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for US Policy,
PARAMETERS, Autumn 2004, at 19, 22 (2004) (furthering that Ankara’s long held
fear is that Kurdish resistance could create an independent Kurdish state which
would destabilize the region as a whole).
117. Yigal Schleifer, How Will Turkey Respond to Growing Rebel Violence,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, at 7, Sept. 22, 2004 (revealing the growing conflicts
between extremist Kurds and the Turkish people).
118. See Cordesman, supra note 73, at A27 (asserting that this would hinder the
war on terrorists).
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states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, would likely feel the need to lend
support, to help prevent Islamist extremists from taking over the
Sunni area of Iraq. 119
Turning to the south, the creation of a nine-province Shi’a region
would expose it to significant Iranian influence. 120 Although some
Shi’a leaders may be receptive to Iranian influence, many other Shi’a
are hostile to Iran as they view themselves as Arabs, not Persians,
and maintain the allegiances that led them to fight with the regime of
Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. 121 In addition to the
increased role Saudi Arabia may play in a Sunni region, the Saudis
object strongly to the idea of a Shi’a region in the south. 122 Saudi
Arabia’s adherence to the “ultra-strict” Wahhabi Sunni school of
Islam has led to strained relations with Shiite Iran and even its own
Shi’a population. 123 Saudi Arabia thus has serious reservations about
another Shi’a dominated region next door. 124
In the end, the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq could permeate
throughout the Middle East and the Arab world, “creating a risk of
local conflicts and the kind of religious tension that feeds Islamist
extremism.” 125 In the words of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,
“Iraq’s disintegration will be a bomb that will blow up the Middle
East.” 126

119. Id.
120. See Horowitz, Unifying Iraq, supra note 112 (noting that the nine-province
region has been pushed for by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim’s party).
121. Id. (asserting that a combined southern region would be a setback for both
the Shi’a that view themselves as Arabs and for American interests).
122. See Juan Cole, Partitioning Iraq, SALON.COM, Oct. 30, 2006,
http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2006/10/30/iraq_partition/ (last visited Sept.
6, 2008) (elaborating that U.S. President Bush and Vice President Cheney are
particularly attentive to Saudi concerns and would therefore also view an
autonomous Shi’a region as undesirable).
123. See id. (estimating that Shi’a form about ten percent of the Saudi
population).
124. Id.
125. Cordesman, supra note 73, at A27.
126. See Iraq Partition will Blow Mideast Up, PRESS TV, Oct. 19, 2007,
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=27747&sectionid=351020201 (last visited
Sept. 6, 2008) (elaborating that safeguards of Iraq’s territorial integrity are needed
to avoid bloodshed in the Middle East).
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D. MASS RELOCATION OF PERSONS
The ethno-sectarian division of Iraq would inevitably cause the
mass displacement of persons. The Brookings Plan projects
approximately two to five million Iraqis might move as a result of
ethnic-sectarian partition. 127 While some plans side-step the issue,
none deny it, and many even call for transferring groups to
appropriate sides of the line so that they are “demographically
separated into defensible enclaves.” 128 Such displacement, however,
is unadvisable, because the widespread relocations would likely be
“violent and impoverish those forced to move, leave a legacy of fear
and hatred, and further delay Iraq’s political and economic
recovery.” 129 Further, this relocation will only compound the ongoing displacement of Iraqis, and would be inconsistent with Iraqi
and U.S. obligations under international humanitarian law. Such
mass displacement would also necessitate increased coalition support
and resources.
1. Displacing the Displaced
The relocation necessary to accomplish the ethno-sectarian
division of Iraq would only compound the on-going displacement.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
127. See JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 19-20 (allowing that the
numbers are huge but the lowest is comparable to what has already happened in
Iraq since 2003).
128. Kaufmann, Possible and Impossible Solutions, supra note 6; see also Gary
Bass, Breaking up (a Country) is Hard to Do, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2006, at B3
(adding that Kaufmann proposes interning civilians on the wrong side of the line to
be used in a population exchange).
129. Cordesman, supra note 73, at A27; see also BAKER, supra note 81, at 31.
[D]evolving Iraq into three semiautonomous regions with loose central
control [Federalism] … could result in mass population movements, collapse
of the Iraqi security forces, strengthening of militias, ethnic cleansing,
destabilization of neighboring states, or attempts by neighboring states to
dominate Iraqi regions. [Further], Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that
such a division would confirm wider fears across the Arab world that the
United States invaded Iraq to weaken a strong Arab state. Id.
But see, JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 11 (“insisting that people remain in
danger to prop up an illusion of political co-existence presents an even larger
moral problem. If offered reasonable alternatives and secure passage, there are
indications that many Iraqis, currently living in fear as vulnerable minorities,
would willingly leave their homes.”).
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(“UNHCR”), there are 3.7 million displaced Iraqis. 130 The UNHCR
anticipated an increase of one million displaced persons in Iraq in
2007. 131 Many of the displaced have resettled in urban areas, such as
Baghdad and Basra, 132 in addition to Kurdish regions where they
experience relatively more security and increased job prospects.133
Any attempt to divide those cities or the Kurdish region may
therefore require the displacement of the already displaced.
Further, internally displaced Iraqis from the majority of areas
overwhelmingly report their intention to return to their place of
origin. The desire to return home weakens the argument that the
current pattern of relocation to more ethnically homogenous areas is
a permanent indicator of the voluntary fragmentation of Iraqi society
along ethnic lines. In the Baghdad area where approximately sixtyfive percent of all displaced Iraqis originate, 134 over seventy-two
percent indicated their desire to return to their place of origin. 135
130. See Sudarsan Raghavan, War in Iraq Propelling a Massive Migration,
WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2007, at A1 (continuing that about 2 million of the displaced
Iraqis have left Iraq to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon).
131. KRISTÈLE YOUNÈS, THE WORLD’S FASTEST GROWING DISPLACEMENT
CRISIS: DISPLACED PEOPLE INSIDE IRAQ RECEIVING INADEQUATE ASSISTANCE 10
(2007), available at http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/issue/detail/9915
(asserting that given the Iraqi government’s reticence in addressing this growing
problem, the international community has a responsibility to respond to the
humanitarian situation in Iraq).
132. CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS & HEINRICH BÖLL FOUNDATION, supra
note 100, at 18 (continuing that less than one to two percent of displaced Iraqis are
in camps).
133. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Many IDPs Seek Refuge in
Kurdish Regions which are More Stable (2007), http://www.internaldisplacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/82EA9EA6AF6142
BFC12572AD0028DCFA?OpenDocument#24.3.1 (adding that the region’s local
economy has benefited from the migration of skilled professionals with disposable
incomes).
134. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, IRAQ DISPLACEMENT:
2007 YEAR IN REVIEW 2 (2008), available at http://www.iom-iraq.net/Library.html
(follow hyperlink for Iraq Displacement 2007 Year in Review, English)
[hereinafter IOM, IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007]; see also Elizabeth Ferris, CoDirector, Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (Dec. 7, 2007) The
Real Challenge of Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Future, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2007/1206_iraq_ferris.aspx?emc=lm&m=211
677&l=22&v=33934 (placing the number of IDPs originating in Baghdad at
approximately eighty percent of all IDPs).
135. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MIGRATION, IRAQ DISPLACEMENT:
2006 YEAR IN REVIEW (2007), at 9, available at http://www.iom-
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2. A Violation of International Humanitarian Law
The mass movement of up to five million people necessary to
accomplish the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq would contravene
international humanitarian law. Under the Guiding Principles of
Internal Displacement, which the participants at the United Nations
World Summit recognized unanimously in September of 2005 “as an
important international framework for the protection of internally
displaced persons,” 136 all states have an obligation “to prevent and
avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of persons.” 137 The
Guiding Principles provide that “[e]very human being shall have the
right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or
her home or place of habitual residence.” 138 This prohibition includes
displacement “based on policies of apartheid, ‘ethnic cleansing’ or
similar practices aimed at/or resulting in altering the ethnic, religious
or racial composition of the affected population.” 139 The ethnosectarian division of Iraq clearly involves altering the ethnic
composition of various areas within Iraq. Moving Shi’a, Sunni, and
Kurdish Iraqis from their homes across the state into regions of
ethnic homogeneity would thus be a displacement that is inconsistent
with the Guiding Principles.
iraq.net/library/2006%20Iraq%20Displacement%20Review.pdf [hereinafter IOM,
IRAQ DISPLACEMENT: 2006] (elaborating that many of these people are waiting for
security to improve).
136. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 132, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
137. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Report
of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted
pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39: Addendum: Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement, Annex, Section II, Principle 5, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement]; see also Ferris, supra note 134 (suggesting that the Guiding
Principles serve as an international standard to guide governments as well as
international humanitarian and development agencies in providing assistance and
protection to IDPs and that they obligate the Iraqi national government to protect
and assist IDPs within its jurisdiction); Walter Kalin, A Tragedy of Increasing
Proportions: Internal Displacement in Iraq, FORCED MIGRATION REVIEW, June
2007, at 14, 15 (suggesting that the Guiding Principles obligate the Iraqi
government to ensure that those who were not able to escape forced displacement
and remain in Iraq are protected and assisted).
138. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 137, at Annex,
Section II, Principle 6.1.
139. Id. at Annex, Section II, Principle 6.2(a).
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3. Unrealistic Troop Requirements for Coalition Forces
The mass movement of people necessary to accomplish the ethnosectarian division of Iraq will also require a great deal of U.S.
support and involvement. 140 In fact, the Brookings Plan devotes
several pages to a detailed proscription for the U.S. led relocation of
persons, 141 conceding that U.S. led Coalition forces and Iraqi security
units should plan for population movements that are fraught with
danger. 142 Indeed, the Brookings Plan acknowledges that “at a
minimum” international troop levels would need to be of such a size
that they “did not scale back deployments in some places while
helping to protect relocating populations elsewhere.” 143 Further, they
acknowledge that “it might actually take somewhat more troops to
implement the soft partition plan than are in Iraq at present.”144 With
coalition budgets and troop levels stretched to their limits, the ethnosectarian division of Iraq would unquestionably require more
coalition support.

E. THE HISTORICAL FAILURE OF
ETHNO-SECTARIAN DIVISION
History demonstrates that ethno-sectarian divisions often fail to
lessen the violence. 145 Many instances of violent conflict follow
140. See JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 17 (“any person who felt the
need to relocate would have to be compensated fairly and assisted in finding a new
life elsewhere.”).
141. Id. at 17-20.
142. See id. at 17 (adding that “[t]hose relocating might be targeted by hateful
neighbors seeking a final chance to settle scores and to ensure that those departing
never return. The displaced individuals themselves might be tempted to take
revenge on their oppressors, with parting shots and burning of the homes of their
enemies. Furthermore, as some members of a local minority relocate, those
minority members remaining behind might feel particularly vulnerable and might
be targeted for expulsion by thugs from the local majority. Finally, even after
moving out of their neighborhoods, convoys of relocating individuals might be
attacked along their departure route. Nothing about the relocation process would
necessarily be easy.”).
143. Id. at 25.
144. Id.
145. See generally Radha Kumar, The Troubled History of Partition, FOREIGN
AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 22. (arguing against a partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
given the occurrences of violence associated with several historical examples of
partition). But see JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 11.
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ethno-sectarian division, as the forced transfer of populations
instigates violent conflict, 146 and often requires a sustained military
and fiscal commitment by both the parties involved and the
international community.
War in Cyprus followed its division between 1963 and 1967, and
Turkish intervention in 1974. 147 During this time, 7,500 people were
killed and over 200,000 Turkish and Greek Cypriots displaced. 148 A
United Nations force remains in Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots

The population movement and expulsions created conditions for the final
recognition of Croatia’s borders, but happened well before there was any
overt Croat-Serb agreement. Although certainly not free from violence (the
Croat commander of the operation is now on trial in the Hague for alleged
war crimes), the forced movements of Serbs from Croatia in 1995 was
nevertheless far less traumatizing and ultimately more stabilizing than the
ferocious, unagreed ethnic cleansing meted out by the Serbs in Bosnia during
1992-5. Id.
However, this analogy fails when one considers that massive displacement
characterized by the Balkan wars, that is not the case in Iraq: though there are
certainly a great deal of displaced Iraqis, the displacement is not near the
magnitude experience in the Balkans. Compare BOGDAN IVANISEVIC, LEGACY OF
WAR: MINORITY RETURNS IN THE BALKANS (2004), http://hrw.org/wr2k4/16.htm
(providing numbers of persons displaced by conflicts in the Balkans, including up
to 350,000 refugees from Croatia, 2.2 million refugees and internally displaced
persons from Bosnia, and 230,000 refugees from Kosovo, and noting that most
displaced persons have not returned home), with HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IRAQ:
FROM A FLOOD TO A TRICKLE 2 (2007), http://hrw.org/backgrounder/
refugees/iraq0407/iraq0407.pdf (estimating that 2 million Iraqis have fled their
homes since the United States’ invasion of Iraq). When considered as a percentage
of their populations, the Balkans conflict produced a displacement of
approximately twenty-five percent of the population, while only about seven
percent of Iraqis are displaced.
146. Sambanis, Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War, supra note 6, at 79
(concluding that to use prevention of future ethnic wars as a rationale for partition
is, at best, erroneous); BRENDAN O’LEARY, CENTRE FOR INT’L BORDERS
RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER 28: DEBATING PARTITION: JUSTIFICATIONS AND
CRITIQUES 17-19 (2006), available at http://www.qub.ac.uk/cibr/WPpdffiles/
MFWPpdf/w28_bol.pdf [hereinafter O’LEARY, DEBATING PARTITION] (suggesting
that past partitions actually led to more violence).
147. Sambanis, supra note 6, at 69.
148. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, THE CYPRUS STALEMATE: WHAT
NEXT? 1-2 (2006), http://www.qub.ac.uk/cibr/WPpdffiles/MFWPpdf/w28_bol.pdf
[hereinafter THE CYPRUS STALEMATE] (noting also that prior to the partition,
intercommunal violence between Turkish and Greek Cypriots led to the forced
displacement of 30,000 Turkish Cypriots from mixed areas into enclaves).
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from violence and to enforce the ceasefire between the two sides, 149
while Turkey maintains a military force of some 30,000 troops in
Northern Cyprus for similar purposes. 150 The ethno-sectarian
division of Cyprus also necessitated fiscal intervention, as Northern
Cyprus, which is not recognized internationally as a sovereign state,
lags behind Southern Cyprus economically and relies on annual
budgetary support from Turkey. 151 One recent report found that the
isolation of the Northern Cypriot community following the division
resulted in losses of over $112,000 (USD) for every Northern
Cypriot, totaling more than $25 billon in losses to the Northern
Cypriot economy. 152
The division of Palestine also did not end conflict in the region,
which saw wars in 1956, 1967, and 1973. 153 Instead, the division of
Palestine and the accompanying conflict led to over 16,000 deaths
and the displacement of over 1.25 million Palestinians and Jews. 154
The United Nations created the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to alleviate the plight
of Palestinians displaced by the partition. In 2006 alone, the UN
spent $598.7 million providing relief to 4.3 million Palestinian
refugees. 155
149. See id. at 1 (acknowledging that the circumstances have changed since the
force was originally deployed in 1964); see also Cyprus – UNFICYP –
Background: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, http://www.un.org/
Depts/dpko/missions/unficyp/background.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2008)
[hereinafter UNFICYP] (describing the mission of the United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus as the maintenance of the military status quo).
150. Turkey affirms anti-Cyprus stance for EU talks, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug.
3, 2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/02/news/turkey.php.
151. See THE CYPRUS STALEMATE, supra note 148, at 2 (explaining that because
Northern Cyprus is so economically dependent on Turkey, it has also fallen victim
to Turkey’s economic inflation and instability).
152. Research Study Reveals the Turkish Cypriots Continue to Suffer Heavily
Under International Isolations, BAYRAK RADIO TELEVISION CO., Apr. 27, 2008,
http://www.brtk.cc/index.php/cat/2/news/31160 (referring to a report by Dr. Omer
Gokcekus which noted that much of this lost revenue is the result of international
embargoes) (report on file with author).
153. See O’LEARY, DEBATING PARTITION, supra note 146, at 18 (describing
these conflicts as part of the domino effect that occurs after a partition).
154. See id. at 17 (clarifying that many of the displaced Jews were expelled from
surrounding Arab states).
155. U.N. Relief and Works Agency, Report of the Commissioner-General of
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East, ¶¶ 1, 64, U.N. Doc. A/62/13 (Aug. 1, 2007) [hereinafter UNRWA Report]
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Since their 1947 partition, India and Pakistan have fought three
wars, in 1948, 1965, and 1971 and maintain a contentious
relationship over Kashmir. 156 When India was partitioned, and
Pakistan created, separating Hindus and Muslims engaged in
widespread communal violence, 20 million people were displaced
and between 500,000 and 1 million were killed. 157 Since the
partition, the two states have fallen into a violent dispute over the
territory of Kashmir, and India has maintained an estimated 600,000
troops in its portion of the region to enforce the ceasefire between the
sides. 158
Following their division in 1991, Eritrea and Ethiopia launched a
border war, 159 with tens of thousands dying. 160 More than 300,000
troops remain along an 800-kilometer border between the two
states, 161 and the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
maintains over 1,600 peacekeeping troops to enforce the ceasefire
between the two states. 162 In April of 2008, UN Secretary General
(adding that the agency is one of the UN’s largest programs).
156. See O’LEARY, DEBATING PARTITION, supra note 146, at 18 (noting that
these conflicts are another example of the domino effect of violence following
ethnic partitioning).
157. Sumantra Bose, Decolonization and State Building in South Asia, J. INT’L
AFF., Fall 2004, at 95, 96 (adding that many of the Indian freedom fighters saw the
division of the country as “the antithesis of the ideals for which they” were
fighting); see also Joya Chatterji, ‘Dispersal’ and the Failure of Rehabilitation:
Refugee Camp-Dwellers and Squatters in West Bengal, 41 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 995,
997-98 (2007) (estimating that 15 million people were displaced in the four months
immediately following the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947); O’LEARY,
DEBATING PARTITION, supra note 146, at 17 (indicating that the number of killed
may be as high as 2 million).
158. See Time to Go, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2007, at 14 (arguing that India should
reduce its troop presence in Kashmir because it is disproportionate to the threat of
insurgency and because the troops have committed human rights violations against
Kashmiris).
159. Sambanis, Possible and Impossible Solutions supra note 6, at 69.
160. UN Fears New Ethiopia-Eritrea War, BBC NEWS, Apr. 11, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7341833.stm (noting that this number represents
only the border violence between 1998-2000).
161. GlobalSecurity.org, Military: Ethiopia/Eritrea War, http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/eritrea.htm (last visited June 29, 2008); see
also INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA: STOPPING THE SLIDE
TO WAR 1 (2007), http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=3170&tid=
5136&l=1 (estimating that Ethiopia maintains 100,000 troops on the border).
162. United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Facts and Figures,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmee/facts.html (last visited Sept. 6,
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Ban Ki-Moon warned the Security Council that the withdrawal of
UN forces would be accompanied by a resumption of hostilities. 163
In Bosnia & Herzegovina, ethnic violence also caused the
displacement of two million people. 164 Some trace much of this
violence to the Vance-Owen plan, which proposed partitioning
Bosnia into ethnically based cantons, and permitting Serbian regions
to de facto confederate with Serbia. 165 The Vance-Owen plan was
also the catalyst for conflict between the Bosnian-Croats and the
Bosnian government, as they struggled to expand their territories,
capture the land promised to them under the plan, and cleanse it of
all other ethnic groups. 166 This cantonization process led to the
commission of so many atrocities that UN Special Rapporteur for
Human Rights Abuses in the Former Yugoslavia, Tadeusz
Mazowiecke, resigned in July 1995 charging that the UN and
International Community’s failure to make any serious efforts to stop
the atrocities in Bosnia made it impossible for him to continue. 167
As these instances of prior state practice illustrate, historical
ethno-sectarian divisions failed to mitigate violence and cost all
parties involved much more in terms of military and financial
2008) (enumerating the UN military personnel in Ethiopia and Eritrea and their
tenure through January 31, 2008).
163. UN Fears New Ethiopia-Eritrea War, supra note 160 (noting that the UN
has already withdrawn most of its forces after Eritrea cut off supplies to the
mission).
164. See Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Resolution 1035, ¶ 17, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1996/210
(Mar. 29, 1996) (reporting that UNHCR had formulated plans to assist Bosnia &
Herzegovina with the return of its two million refugees and displaced persons).
165. PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE?: WAR
CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 24 (2002)
(explaining that the Vance-Owen plan sought to achieve peace by ratifying the
aims of the campaigns of ethnic cleansing and legitimizing the anti-multicultural
nationalism propagated by the Serbian and Croatian regimes).
166. Id. at 140; COLONEL BOB STEWART, BROKEN LIVES: A PERSONAL VIEW OF
THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT (1994); LEE BRYANT, THE BETRAYAL OF BOSNIA 42-44
(1993), available at http://www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/PDF/Bryant%20-%20The%
20Betrayal%20of%20Bosnia.pdf (providing a comprehensive assessment of the
cantonization proposals and implementation); see generally MLADEN KLEMENČIĆ,
TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR IN BOSNIAHERCEGOVINA (Martin Pratt & Clive Schofield eds., 1994) (reviewing the
numerous proposals for the territorial division of Bosnia).
167. WILLIAMS & SCHARF, supra note 165, at 140; Balkan Action Council,
Balkan Watch Week in Review, July 31, 1996.
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support. There is no reason to expect the ethno-sectarian division of
Iraq would be any different.

F. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
The Iraqi Constitution’s provisions relating to the formation of
regions is likely to make the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq nearly
impossible. In order to form three ethno-sectarian based regions
within Iraq, whether through partition or ethno-sectarian based
federalism, Iraqis would need to assimilate multiple governorates in
the desired area. The Iraqi Constitution, however, contains specific
mechanisms by which one or more governorates may reorganize into
autonomous regions. 168 Governorates may create a region by either
(1) “[the] request by one-third (1/3) of the council members of each
governorate intending to form a region” or (2) “[the] request by onetenth (1/10) of the voters in each of the governorates intending to
form a region.” 169 Article 127 of the Iraqi Constitution sets the voting
threshold for passing a referendum at a majority of voters. 170 Since
most Iraqis oppose ethno-sectarian division, it seems unlikely that
plans for the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq could overcome either
of the tests laid out in the Iraqi Constitution. 171
Additionally, a great hurdle exists to the formation of a region of
more than one governorate in which competing views or visions for

168. See IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 115 (setting out a referendum procedure by
which one or more governorates may seek organization into a region).
169. Id.
170. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 127 (qualifying the majority rule for referenda as
the general rule unless otherwise stipulated).
171. See Stephen Zunes, Support for Iraq Partition: Cynical and Dangerous,
FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4639
(asserting that most Iraqis who support creating a federal system advocate a
process based on geography rather than ethnicity and religion); see also Ned
Parker & Raheem Salman, A Divided Iraq Unites Against Partition Plan, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007, at A4 (reporting that Iraq’s normally divided leadership
unitedly denounced a non-binding U.S. resolution endorsing decentralization
through the creation of semi-autonomous regions); Iraqi TV Channels Carry
Reactions to US Senate Resolution, supra note 48 (quoting Iraqi political analysts,
politicians and spokesmen for various groups as denouncing the U.S. call for
partition as a violation of the Iraqi Constitution and misunderstanding of the
country’s history and current political climate.); 2007 POLL, supra note 47, at 13
(finding that ninety-eight percent of the Iraqi population oppose separation along
sectarian lines.).
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the region exist. 172 In such a situation, the Law on Formation of
Regions provides that in the case of competing initiatives, a prereferendum poll will be held in each governorate to decide which
regional vision will be put to the vote in a referendum. 173 “In order to
succeed, a federal initiative must win this stage in every governorate
concerned, and then receive an absolute majority in the subsequent
referendum—again in each of the governorates targeted in the
regional initiative.” 174 With such a high standard (consensus of a
majority in each governorate as to the vision of the region), the great
public opposition to ethno-sectarian division, and in light of the
diversity of the proposed regions, a constitutionally valid formation
of three ethno-sectarian based regions is highly unlikely.

G. THE EMERGING PILLARS OF
CONSENSUS BASED GOVERNANCE
Given the relative flood of legislation passed in February of 2008,
the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq would fail to capitalize on the
emerging political cooperation. As Jason Gluck of the United States
Institute of Peace adeptly observed, “February 13 may . . . be
remembered as the day when issue-politics rose above ethnic and
sectarian ideology.” 175 On February 13, 2008, Iraqi politics “moved
to a new level” by achieving two compromises necessary to pass
three laws (Provincial Powers Law, Amnesty Law, and 2008
Budget). 176 First, the linking of the three laws reflected compromise
from all parties. Generally speaking, the Kurds prioritized revenue
distribution, the Sunnis the Amnesty law, and the Shi’a the
provincial powers law (though there were conflicting positions

172. Law of the Executive Procedures Regarding the Formation of Regions
(2006) (Iraq), arts. 3, 4 available at http://www.ncciraq.org/spip.php?article2422.
173. Id. art. 4, Second (b).
174. Visser & Stansfield, supra note 63, at 18 (emphasis added); see also Iraq,
Law on Formation of Regions, art. 6.
175. JASON GLUCK, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, FROM GRIDLOCK TO
COMPROMISE: HOW THREE LAWS COULD BEGIN TO TRANSFORM IRAQI POLITICS
(2008),
http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0319_iraqi_politics
.html.
176. See id. (describing how the passage of the three independently significant
laws, the result of concessions and compromise among the parties, revealed a new
period in the Iraqi political dynamics).
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among the Shi’a groups). 177 Second, by bundling the three laws
together the parties found a “creative and unprecedented” means of
achieving accord in Iraqi politics. 178
The compromises of February 13, 2008, though momentous, are
not an anomaly in Iraqi politics. Prior compromises reflect the ability
of Iraqis to work together and often go unnoticed or unannounced by
those proposing the ethno-division of Iraq. In October of 2006,
Sunnis, Sadrists, and secularists joined to temporarily block passage
of the Law on the Executive Procedures to Form Regions. 179 In
“response to the June 13, 2007 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in
Samarra” various ethnic and sectarian leaders made unified
statements “condemning the act and calling for calm.” 180 In January
2008, a coalition of ten Shi’a and Sunni political parties formed the
National Understanding Project in an effort to block certain Kurdish
ambitions for decentralization.
In passing these three laws, “Iraqi politicians learned they could
reach consensus on a broad range of issues where resolution of any
one would have been difficult if not impossible standing alone.” 181
Though it is conceded that these signs of political compromise and
reduced friction are limited, they provide “cautious hope, that a new
political culture is beginning to take root in Iraq—one based not on
pure power politics, but a principled respect for the rule of law.” 182

IV. THE ALTERNATIVE: MODERN
MULTI-ETHNIC FEDERALISM
Given our analysis as set forth above, our position is that the
political future of Iraq is a federal structure based on existing

177. See id. (detailing each of the major ethnicities’ priorities: the Kurds
receiving seventeen percent of the national revenue, the Sunnis obtaining the
release of thousands of detainees, and the Shi’a providing limited autonomy for
provinces with a deadline for provincial elections).
178. Id.
179. Law of the Executive Procedures Regarding the Formation of Regions
(2006) (Iraq).
180. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MEASURING STABILITY AND
SECURITY IN IRAQ: SEPTEMBER 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2007),
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Signed-Version-070912.pdf.
181. GLUCK, supra note 175.
182. Id.
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political and legal structures and respectful of the complex history of
Iraq. The Iraqi Constitution, despite all its failings and
inconsistencies, provided Iraqis with the opportunity to rebuild their
homeland from the ground up, together, and with a common vision
in mind. Therefore much of what this Article proposes builds upon
existing legal infrastructure, and the significant progress that has
been made in ratifying the Constitution and subsequently passing the
formation of regions and provincial powers laws.
The plan set forth herein asserts the fundamental position that the
future of Iraq is better served by a federalist structure based upon an
18 governorate model as set forth in the Constitution. The subfederal boundaries are already drawn; Iraqis are in a position to
devolve appropriate power to these entities in an asymmetric and
gradual manner. Concurrent with the power devolution, Iraq would
benefit from the development of a system of resource and revenue
distribution so as to ensure fair and equitable growth and prosperity
across the federation. Coordination mechanisms such as framework
legislation and dispute resolution committees would also be
necessary. In order to respect the complex and diverse identities of
Iraqis, safeguards need be established to protect the rights of subfederal entities and Iraq’s many minorities.

A. FEDERALIST STRUCTURE WITH
EIGHTEEN GOVERNORATES
Iraq presently has a federalist structure with eighteen governorates
as set forth in the Constitution. 183 Federations are states with multitiered governments that involve a combination of shared rule by
central and regional government institutions as provided in the
Constitution. 184 Each government tier rules over different matters,
and neither is subordinate to the other. 185 Importantly, the original
motivation for a federalist structure comprised of the eighteen
existing Iraqi governorates was that it would ensure that no unit

183. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 112.
184. See id. art. 110 (detailing the list of powers to be shared between the federal
and regional authorities).
185. See id. art. 107 (listing the federal government’s exclusive powers); id. art.
111 (reserving all powers not under exclusive federal control to the regional
authorities).
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making up the federation would be dominated by any one ethnic
group. 186
Both the 2005 Iraqi Constitution and the 2008 Provincial Powers
Law establish a federal structure with a strong central government.
Article 1 of the Constitution provides that, “[t]he Republic of Iraq is
a single, independent federal State with full sovereignty.” 187 Article
106 also obligates the Iraqi government to maintain Iraq’s
democratic federal system. 188 According to the 2008 Provincial
Powers Law, which took effect following the October 1, 2008
provincial council elections, provinces may “adopt local legislation
. . . in a manner that enables [them] to run [their] affairs according to
the administrative decentralization principle and in a way that does
not contradict the Constitution and the federal laws.” 189 John
McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, authors of The Future of Kurdistan
in Iraq, have described the present structure:
Iraq’s Constitution actually eschews both the one-size-fits-all
preference of the integrationists and the inclination of the
three-regions advocates, in favor of a bespoke, flexible, or
voluntarily asymmetrical federation tailored to whatever
(legitimate) preferences exist, or come to exist, among Iraq’s
democratic constituencies. In this respect, the Constitution
takes a liberal consociational approach that is focused on
democratic preferences rather than on predetermined ethnic
or communal categories. 190
The goal of the Iraqi federal structure may be best served by a
balance of shared and self-rule. The federal structure must
accommodate the need for robust central government power and
186. BRENDAN O’LEARY & JOHN MCGARRY, CONSTITUTION BUILDING AND
FEDERAL OPTIONS IN IRAQ: THE KURDISH CHALLENGE, available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LHON-6AQCGW
?OpenDocument [hereinafter O’LEARY & MCGARRY, CONSTITUTION BUILDING].
187. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 1.
188. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 106 (requiring that “[t]he federal authorities shall
preserve the unity, integrity, independence and sovereignty of Iraq and its federal
democratic system”).
189. Provincial Powers Law, art. 2 (Iraq), available at http://www.washington
institute.org/html/newsletterImages/DraftProvincialPowersLawForWeb.pdf.
190. John McGarry & Brendan O’Leary, Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal
Consociation as Political Prescription, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 679, 686-87 (2007)
[hereinafter McGarry & O’Leary, Iraq’s Constitution of 2005].
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resources to manage Iraqi diversity and avoid a self-destructing civil
war. The state structure could also be designed to accommodate the
territorial-based identities of most Iraqis and their legitimate desire to
maintain control over local issues. According to one commentator:
“[s]afety and stability are more likely to be found, not by locking in
on and privileging these three communal identities, but by
structuring a federation that is, as far as possible, permissive—by
building a federal system that permits many forms of identity,
including the national, to achieve expression.” 191
As the Public International Law & Policy Group previously noted
in a report jointly published with The Century Foundation, the
primary advantage of a federal system is that it is appropriate for
states with “a diverse and pluralistic population with a desire to
maintain national unity,” such as Iraq. 192 “In a federal structure
comprised of numerous constituent units, the diverse groups will
have some stake in the central government and may be able to
protect and promote their interests through effective
representation.” 193 Federal governments also tend to promote
moderate leaders who “must appeal to a broad political base because
such structures group villages and municipalities into larger
constituent units.” 194
Iraqi federalism could relatively easily be based upon the eighteen
governorate structure already provided for in the Iraq Constitution.
Federations with fewer regions (two or three) are less stable than
those with many. 195 While two-region federations are prone to
collapse, 196 three-unit federations are also fragile, as “opportunities
191. David Cameron, Making Federalism Work, in IRAQ: PREVENTING A NEW
GENERATION OF CONFLICT 153, 159 (Markus E. Bouillon, David M. Malone &
Ben Roswell eds., 2007).
192. Establishing a Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure, 39 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 53, 68-69 (2003).
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. RONALD L. WATTS, COMPARING FEDERAL SYSTEMS 113-14 (1999)
[hereinafter WATTS, COMPARING FEDERAL SYSTEMS] (explaining that federal
systems with fewer regions, in particular bipolar federations, are unstable because
each region is generally given veto powers over all matters, often leading to
impassable deadlocks).
196. McGarry & O’Leary, Iraq’s Constitution of 2005, supra note 190, at 679
(“[A]s the experience of Czechoslovakia, pre-1971 Pakistan, and, more recently,
Serbia and Montenegro suggests, because there are few opportunities for shifting
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for shifting coalitions are still limited.” 197 According to Keith Mines,
a former US Special Forces Officer and founding member of the
Council on Emerging National Security Affairs “[t]he only way
[Iraq] can be functional over the long term is if it is organized around
a federation model for its [eighteen] governorates, which breaks
down confessional groups (e.g., Shi’a, Sunni) at the local level,
leading to provincial political identification that facilitates national
unity.” 198 Under the system of eighteen governorates, Iraqis are more
free to associate politically as they see fit, rather than having political
identities and units forced upon them based on ethno-sectarian
identities.
In implementing the eighteen governorates structure, it may be
necessary to give attention to the negative connotation many Iraqis
apply to the term federalism. Carole O’Leary of American University
makes the point that public sentiment among Sunni and Shi’a Iraqis
over Iraqi federalism is obfuscated by Kurdish efforts for increased
autonomy. 199 According to former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari, a
common Iraqi perspective is that federalism is solely related to the
Kurdish region in the north of Iraq. 200 Noah Feldman of Harvard
Law School also observed that following the coalition takeover of
Iraq, “federalism negotiations were always about the balance
between the Kurds’ regional government and the federal authorities
in Baghdad . . . .” 201 Federalism was thus interpreted by some as a
politically acceptable way of preserving a unified Iraq while

alliances and the two units tend to be pitted against each other on every issue.”).
197. Id.
198. Keith W. Mines, After the Surge: Toward an 18-State Federation, FOREIGN
SERV. J., Mar. 2008, at 22, 23.
199. Carole O’Leary, Research Professor, American University School of
International Service, Remarks at the American University International Law
Review and Public International Law and Policy Group Symposium, Rethinking
the Future: The Next Five Years in Iraq (Feb. 11, 2008) (transcript on file with the
American University International Law Review)
200. Interview by Jane Corbin with Ibrahim Jaafari, Prime Minister in Iraq
(Mar. 18, 2006), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/
4820858.stm (contending that the idea of federalism in Iraq generally related to the
Kurdistan region and became an agreed upon constitutional reality).
201. Noah Feldman, Agreeing to Disagree in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005,
at A19.
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recognizing Kurdish autonomy, 202 while other saw it as a “Kurdish
ploy” for independence deserving great skepticism. 203

B. DEVOLVE POWER
Critical to the sustainability of the political and economic stability
of the state is for power to be transferred from the central
government to the governorates. Key to maintaining this stability is
ensuring that power is devolved only where appropriate,
asymmetrically, and in a gradual manner that is consistent with each
governorate’s ability to accept such powers. 204
1. Devolution of Power Only Where Appropriate 205
The Iraqi Constitution already achieves a great deal in determining
where devolution is appropriate. As such, the Constitution,
augmented by the provincial powers law, could be the foundation for
the devolution of power in Iraq. The Constitution provides for the
powers of regions or governorates. 206 Specifically, Article 111
provides that any powers not clearly granted to the federal
government are reserved for the regions or governorates. 207
Additionally, Article 110 provides for concurrent powers between
the federal government and sub-federal governments including
customs management, electric energy and its distribution,

202. Id.
203. Nimrod Raphaeli, Kurdistan – The Quest for Statehood, KURDISTAN
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2008, (reporting that the new political leaders who had previously
promised to support the Kurdish cause while serving as opposition to the Saddam
Hussein regime, reneged on their promises and viewed the issue of federalism as it
pertained to the Kurdish region as one in need of “multiple revisions”).
204. Abdel Salam Sidahmed, Islamism, Nationalism and Sectarianism, in IRAQ:
PREVENTING A NEW GENERATION OF CONFLICT 71, 84 (Markus E. Bouillon, David
M. Malone & Ben Roswell eds., 2007) (noting that the devolution of power in Iraq
should be done in a way that is “consensus-based, accommodative, participatory,
and equitable in terms of power and resource sharing for the various Iraqi
communities and regions.”).
205. See PAUL R. WILLIAMS, MATTHEW T. SIMPSON & CHRISTINA J. SHEETZ,
PEACE AGREEMENT DRAFTING GUIDE: DARFUR (Public International Law and
Policy Group 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1078714 (providing a
more thorough consideration of the core elements of political devolution).
206. IRAQ CONSTITUTION arts. 107, 111.
207. Id. art. 111.
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environmental policy, development and planning policies, public
health policy, public education policy, and water resource policy.208
Though Article 110 describes these powers as concurrent (to be
shared between the federal government and the sub-federal entities),
Article 111 provides that in the event of a dispute over these
concurrent powers, the governorate or region’s law shall receive
priority. 209 This implicitly gives the regions or governorates not
organized into a region control over the Article 114 powers. The
Provincial Powers law augments the Constitution by granting
governorates direct authority over local security, 210 allowing
governorate officials to “oversee and inspect public facilities in the
province (other than courts, military units, universities, colleges, and
institutions)” and giving the officials of the governorate limited
“input into the appointment of senior ministry officials in the
province . . . allows them to dismiss such officials by an absolute
majority vote in the provincial council.” 211
Though devolving a good deal of power to the regions and
governorates, the Iraqi Constitution also provides the federal
government in Baghdad with relatively robust controls. The authority
provided to the central government in Article 109 to “preserve the
unity, integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Iraq and its federal
democratic system” is broad and provides a foundation for a
federalist system with a strong central government. 212 Several of
Article 110’s exclusive federal powers (national security, fiscal
policy, national budget, interstate commerce) support a strong
national government within a federation. 213 Consistent with this
strong central government, the Provincial Powers Law grants the
Council of Representatives the power to remove provincial

208. Id. art. 110.
209. Id. arts. 110, 111.
210. Provincial Powers Law, art. 31 (Iraq) (authorizing the Governor of each
governorate to control local security agencies and departments charged with
protection, conservation and order); see also IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 117(5)
(granting regional governments the power to organize their own security forces
and other regional administrative matters).
211. GLUCK, supra note 175. See Provincial Powers Law, 2008, art. 31.4 (Iraq)
(imparting section over most public facilities with the Governor of the region); see
also Provincial Powers Law, 2008, art. 7.9 (Iraq).
212. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 109; Cameron, supra note 191, at 163.
213. Cameron, supra note 191, at 163.
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governors and dissolve provincial councils, and allows the Council
of Ministers to remove other senior provincial officials. 214 Provincial
revenue is also derived largely from allocations from the federal
budget. 215 Additionally, the prohibition against contradicting federal
laws protects the strength of the central government, as any
provincial attempt to modify federal ministerial regulation is
voidable as contradicting federal law. 216
Federal control over foreign affairs (including the armed services
and national security), monetary policy, customs and duties,
communications, interregional transportation, debt management,
immigration and naturalization, and management of the national
economy is consistent with state practice. 217 Likewise, providing for
sub-federal control over education, health, social welfare, police
powers, local taxes, and regional transportation is also consistent
with state practice. 218 Article 111 of the Iraqi Constitution reserves

214. GLUCK, supra note 175; Provincial Powers Law, 2008, art. 20.2 (Iraq)
(stating that “[t]he Council of Representatives may dissolve the Council by
absolute majority upon the request of the Governor or one third of the Governorate
Council”).
215. Provincial Powers Law, art. 44 (Iraq) (stating that the Governorates
financial resources consist of, inter alia, the budget granted by the Federal
Government); GLUCK, supra note 175 (observing that “[t]he Provincial Powers
Law bestows no tax power upon the provinces, but does grant undefined authority
to levy local fees and fines, and generate revenue from services and investment
projects, as well as grants and donations.”).
216. See GLUCK, supra note 175 (asserting that the proscription against adopting
local legislation that contradicts federal laws is a key limitation on provincial
authority, as almost every federal ministry has or will have statutes granting them
authority to regulate within their respective spheres, thereby limiting provincial
ability to modify ministerial regulations).
217. Internationally, many nations have taken a similar approach to federal
control. See, e.g., CONST. OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, 1995, art. III;
Bougainville Peace Agreement (Papua N.G.), Aug. 30, 2001, available at
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/Melanesia/documents/bougainville/PDF/BougainvillePeace
Agreement29Aug01.pdf; CONSTITUTION § 51 (Austl.); GRUNDGESETZ [GG]
[Constitution] art. 73 (F.R.G.); COSTITUZIONE [COST.] [Constitution] art. 117
(Italy); CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER OF THE STATE UNION OF SERBIA AND
MONTENEGRO art. 19; Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft
[BV] [Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999, arts. 54, 58, 60, 61, 65 (Switz.).
218. Regional governments are delegated similar powers in many nations. See,
e.g., Bougainville Peace Agreement (Papua N.G.); CONST. (1987), Art. X, (Phil.);
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 Schedule 5. The Constitution of South Africa also
specifically lists concurrent powers. Id. Schedule 4.
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unnamed powers to the regional and governorate governments. 219
The architects of the Iraqi Constitution designed a power sharing
structure that is effective and sufficiently nuanced to account for the
diversity of the eighteen governorates and their people.
2. Asymmetric Devolution
Often following violent conflicts, provinces lack the ability to
govern effectively, yet creation of provincial governments seems
necessary for political stability. A phased and asymmetric approach
to the assumption of powers by sub-federal governments thus
provides crucial time to build capacity and infrastructure.220 In states
219. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 111; Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3
(U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C, No. 5 (Appendix 1985), art. 91 (Can.) (“. . . the
exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters
coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to
say . . . [cl. 29] Such Classes of Subjects as are expressly excepted in the
Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the
Legislatures of the Provinces.”); INDIA CONST. art. 246, cl. 97 (“Any other matter
not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of
those Lists.”); LAWS OF MALAYSIA [Constitution] art. 77 (“The Legislature of a
State shall have power to make laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in
any of the Lists set out in the Ninth Schedule, not being a matter in respect of
which Parliament has power to make laws.”). But see BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [Constitution] art. 15(1) (Austria) (“Insofar as a
matter is not expressly transferred by the Federal Constitution to the legislation or
also the execution of the Federation, it remains in the independent competence of
the Länder.”); Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution], art. 25(1) (Braz.)
(“Powers not forbidden to them by this Constitution are reserved to the States.”);
GG art. 70(1) (F.R.G.) (“The Länder [States] shall have the right to legislate
insofar as this Basic Law does not confer legislative power on the Federation.”);
COST. (Italy) art. 117 (“The regions have the legislative power with respect to any
matter not expressly reserved to the legislation of the State.”); CONSTITUTION Art.
4(7) (2005) (Nig.) (“The House of Assembly of a State shall have power to make
laws for the peace, order and good government of the State or any part thereof with
respect to the following matters, that is to say: (a) any matter not included in the
Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to this
Constitution.”); KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [Konst. RF] [Constitution]
art. 73 (Russ.) (“Outside the limits of authority of the Russian Federation and of
the powers of the Russian Federation on issues falling under the joint jurisdiction
of the Russian Federation and subjects of the Russian Federation, the subjects of
the Russian Federation shall possess the plenitude of State power.”).
220. For example, the 2001 peace agreement between Bougainville and Papua
New Guinea provides for a gradual devolution of powers from the central
government to the autonomous Bougainville government “taking full account of
needs and capacity.” Bougainville Peace Agreement (Papua N.G.) art. 101. Also,
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where different sub-federal governments assume different powers
over time, the characteristics of gradual devolution vary in terms of
the criteria applied and evaluation of progress. 221
The devolution of power in Iraq described above provides for the
asymmetrical allocation of power and responsibility to ensure fair
participation of each of the eighteen governorates and to respect the
Kurdish region’s constitutionally-provided status as a region. 222
Article 114.4 of the Iraqi Constitution also provides for the
asymmetric distribution of revenue to the governorates and regions
based upon their resources and needs. 223
Given the varied governorate capacity levels, each governorate is
in a different position to provide services and assume powers
devolved from the federal government. Similarly, the governorates
have different priorities, with some concerned with control of oil
fields and others concerned with control of electric power grids. 224
Devolving power asymmetrically allows the central government to
accommodate the governorates’ differing preferences, while ensuring
that the governorates’ power and control of resources are shared
among them. Of course, the determination of the share of each power
allocated to each governorate will be challenging, but the ability of
Iraqi legislators to craft solutions to difficult problems was evidenced
by their ability to simultaneously pass three key pieces of benchmark
legislation on February 13, 2008. 225
in Spain, the Autonomous Communities can elect which powers they want to have
within constitutionally-defined limits. CONSTITUCIÓN [C.E.] art. 148 (Spain).
Further, if the Autonomous Communities cannot meet their obligations, the central
government may take steps to compel the Autonomous Communities to fulfill their
obligations. Id. art. 155.
221. See, e.g., C.E. art. 148 (Spain) (outlining some twenty-two categories over
which Autonomous Communities may have jurisdiction including municipal
boundaries, planning and housing within townships, recreational ports, airports,
woodlands, agriculture, inland fishing, local fairs, museums, and social assistance).
222. See VIJAYA SAMARAWEERA, USAID, LAW ON THE EXECUTIVE
PROCEDURES FOR REGION FORMATION: AN ANALYSIS (2007), available at
http://www.lgp-iraq.org/publications/index.cfm?fuseaction=throwpub&ID=163
(suggesting that the unique consideration of the Kurdish area as its own region is
reflective of the asymmetrical federalism enshrined in the Iraqi Constitution).
223. See IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 109 (stating that resources will be distributed
proportionate to the population).
224. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the tension between governorates over
natural resources in Iraq).
225. See supra Part III.G (recognizing the significance of the agreements
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C. RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION
Iraq’s natural resources must be distributed equitably to allow
prosperity throughout the nation. 226 The Iraqi Constitution recognizes
this need to allocate resources fairly,227 and Iraq’s leaders could build
upon the constitutional framework to develop a strong resource
distribution scheme. The current situation in Iraq is unfortunate, with
intra-governmental infighting over control of oil, water and
electricity. 228
The Iraqi Constitution provides that oil and gas resources belong
to all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates, 229 and
that the revenues shall be distributed in a fair manner in all parts of
the country to ensure balanced development throughout Iraq.230 The
federal government, in cooperation with the oil producing
governorates and regions, is charged with managing oil and gas
extracted from current fields, provided that it allocates the wealth “in
a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts
of the country.” 231
Currently, the Ministry of Electricity oversees the production and
distribution of Iraq’s electric power. 232 However, the production of
electricity requires oil to fuel its generators, so the Ministry of
Electricity must work with the Ministry of Oil. However, the two
ministries do not always cooperate, and the Ministry of Oil’s focus
reached by the Iraqi legislators over issues that have been the source of tension
between the governorates).
226. See Nicholas “Fink” Haysom, Forging an Inclusive Social Contract, in
IRAQ: PREVENTING A NEW GENERATION OF CONFLICT 143, 146 (Markus E.
Bouillon, David M. Malone & Ben Roswell eds., 2007) (arguing that the Iraqi
constitution should reflect the country’s need to distribute natural resources fairly).
227. See IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 117.3 (“Regions and governorates shall be
allocated an equitable share of the national revenues sufficient to discharge their
responsibilities and duties, but having regard to their own resources, needs and size
of their population.”).
228. See Mohammed A Salih, Iraqis Fight Over Oil Spoils, ASIA TIMES,
available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ26Ak01.html (last
visited Sept. 15, 2008) (emphasizing the crisis over control of oil and other
resources by the segregated regions in Iraq).
229. See IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 108.
230. See id. art 117.3.
231. See id.
232. See Ministry of Electricity Official Website, http://www.moelc.gov.iq/
default_en.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2008).
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on exporting oil to raise Iraqi revenues has led to a shortage of oil
available in Iraq to fuel power plants, 233 causing power plants to shut
down. 234
Furthermore, even when power plants in the governorates are
operating, the electricity that they generate must be transmitted to
Baghdad. 235 In the past, Saddam Hussein redirected much of Iraq’s
electricity into Baghdad, leaving much of rural Iraq without
power. 236 Now that the governorates have more control over the
amount of electricity that they produce, many refuse to share their
electricity with Baghdad, particularly those governorates in the
Shi’a-dominated South. 237 In addition to depriving Iraqis of
electricity, government infighting and the governorates’ failure to
cooperate has impacted Iraq’s water supply. 238 Electricity is
necessary to run water treatment facilities and to pump water through
pipes in homes. 239 With Iraqis having only limited amounts of
233. See Glenn Zorpette, Oil and Electricity Ministries Won’t Mix, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., Mar. 10, 2008, at 6 (discussing the strained relations between the
Ministers of Oil and Electricity, and explaining that the Minister of Oil has strong
ties to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a dominant Shiite
party, while the Minister of Electricity has little political clout).
234. C.f. Greg Bruno, Council on Foreign Relations: Rebuilding Iraq, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15019/
rebuilding_iraq.html (outlining the wide disparities in the availability of electricity
in different parts of Iraq, with residents of Kirkuk having up to twelve hours of
electricity per day and residents of some rural areas having only four hours of
electricity per day).
235. See James Glanz & Stephen Farrell, Militias Seizing Control of Grid,
Starving Baghdad of Electricity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007, at A1 (explaining that
there is no central electricity switching station in Iraq, so the governorates have to
share their electricity by flipping a switch that would transmit power to Baghdad).
236. See id.; Alexandra Zavis, It’s a Power Struggle Every Day, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2008, at A4 (comparing Baghdad’s electricity availability and
consumption during Hussein’s regime with current trends).
237. See Glanz & Farrell, supra note 239 (noting that Sadr’s Mahdi Army has
had control of the electric power plant in Basra and shut off the power in strategic
places in Basra as part of his offensive against U.S. and British forces in May
2007).
238. See Iraq: Water Shortage Leads People to Drink from Rivers,
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=70243 (last visited Sept. 7, 2008)
(explaining that corruption and insecurity among the municipalities is the cause of
the water shortages in Iraq).
239. See Bruno, supra note 234 (noting that although Iraqis’ access to potable
water has surpassed prewar levels overall, there are still wide disparities in access
to potable water in different areas of Iraq because of unavailability of electricity).
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electricity per day, most do not have running water in their homes,
and much of the water that is available to Iraqi citizens is
untreated. 240
A successful federal structure in Iraq thus requires strong resource
distribution mechanisms to combat government infighting and to
ensure that the fairness and equality called for in the Constitution can
be achieved. One such mechanism is a joint natural resources
authority charged with regulating the distribution of resources
between the central and governorate governments. Joint resource
authorities promote sub-federal participation in the control of certain
resources within a state as they encourage power sharing between the
federal and sub-federal governments. A joint natural resource
authority could include representatives of the federal and governorate
governments such that it will allow for governorate participation and
encourage equitable and responsible regulation. 241

D. REVENUE SHARING
A successful federal structure needs fair mechanisms for sharing
the revenue generated from Iraq’s resources. The need for robust, fair
and flexible revenue distribution mechanisms is compounded by the
current economic environment in Iraq. Iraqis face a void of economic
trade, 242 an unemployment and underemployment rate that some

240. See OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, RISING TO THE HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGE
IRAQ 3 (2007), available at http://www.oxfam.org/files/Rising%20to%20the
%20humanitarian%20challenge%20in%20Iraq.pdf (reporting that seventy percent
of Iraqis lack access to clean water, and claiming that much of Iraq’s water is
contaminated from the dumping of sewage into rivers).
241. See Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act, 1967, c. 8(a) (Austl.) (outlining the
authority of one of Australia’s multiple joint resources authorities, each composed
of representatives from the federal government and one province); see also
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord art. 12.03, Can.-N.S.,
Aug. 26, 1986, available at http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/regulatory/pdfs/Accord.pdf
(describing the Canada-Nova Scotia Board of Petroleum Resources as one that
issues discovery and production licenses, approves development plans, and makes
decisions regarding operating licenses and authorizations for work). The Board of
Petroleum Resources has considerable power over certain responsibilities but its
decisions over other matters are subject to challenge and review by representatives
of the federal and provincial governments. Id. art. 13. In some instances, the
provincial minister may alone veto particular decisions of the board. Id.
242. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 180, at 10.
IN
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estimate may be as high as forty percent, 243 inflation running over
seventy percent, 244 and fifty-four percent of the population living on
less than one dollar (U.S.) per day. 245 Add to this the fact that more
than ninety percent of Iraq’s government revenue comes from oil
exports, but not all governorates have access to oil deposits, 246 and
the picture becomes quite clear: Iraqis need revenue sharing that is
fair and effective.
Currently, regions and governorates are entitled to “an equitable
share of the national revenues sufficient to discharge its
responsibilities and duties . . . having regard to its resources, needs
and the percentage of its population” 247 A constitutional obligation
exists to pursue a balanced development strategy through which
revenues from current fields are distributed fairly. 248 Also, as this
constitutional provision makes clear, the territorial status of the
Kirkuk governorate has been decoupled from the oil revenues that
flow from its oilfields. As Kirkuk’s oil comes from currently
exploited fields, its revenues are to be redistributed across Iraq.
To augment the constitutional provisions for fair and effective
revenue distribution, Iraq may consider establishing a fair
mechanism for the calculation of revenue distribution, 249 and
243. See UN ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR IRAQ, HUMANITARIAN BRIEFING ON THE
CRISIS IN IRAQ 3 (2007), available at http://www.uniraq.org/documents/UNIraq%20Humanitarian%20Briefing%20Fact%20Sheet%20May%2007.pdf
(reporting unemployment between twenty-five and forty percent).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See Cordesman, supra note 73 (stating that while the vast majority of Iraq’s
government revenue comes from oil exports, the Sunni west has no claim to oil
revenues because they lack developed oil fields).
247. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 117.
248. See Vanessa Jimenez, Iraq’s Constitutional Process: Challenges on the
Road Ahead, 13 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 21, 23 (2005) (explaining that the Iraq
constitution contains “mechanisms” aimed at ensuring equitable and fair
distribution of the economic benefit of the country’s natural resources).
249. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY AND FINANCE GOVERNMENT OF
WESTERN AUSTRALIA, SPECIFIC PURPOSE PAYMENTS (SSPS), available at
http://www.dtf.wa.gov.au/cms/tre_content.asp?id=1909 (last visited Sept. 7, 2008)
[hereinafter SPECIFIC PURPOSE PAYMENTS] (explaining the variables of the formula
used to distribute Australia’s Special Purpose Payments). In Australia, the federal
government collects most of the tax revenue and disburses large transfers to the
provinces. See DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY AND FINANCE GOVERNMENT OF
WESTERN AUSTRALIA, COMMONWEALTH GRANTS, available at http://www.dtf.wa
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procedures for adjusting federal-governorate financial arrangements
in recognition of the volatility of commodities markets. 250 As PILPG
Senior Peace Fellow Vanessa Jimenez suggested in 2005, “if
properly implemented and interpreted,” a reformed revenue
calculation and distribution scheme would allow Kurds and Shi’a “to
exercise the self-governance that they desire,” while assuring Sunnis
of their fair share of the national wealth. 251

E. COORDINATION MECHANISMS
The political instability affecting Iraq presents a challenge for
implementing a successful federal structure. Disorganization and
distrust permeate throughout all levels of government. To tackle this
challenge head on, Iraqis could develop several coordination
mechanisms including framework legislation to transparently and
clearly delineate governmental responsibilities, committees to
address government coordination and to settle disputes between

.gov.au/cms/tre_content.asp?id=1917 (last visited Sept. 7, 2008) [hereinafter
COMMONWEALTH GRANTS]. The Commonwealth Grants Commission recommends
the amount of general-purpose transfers from the federal government to specific
provinces using a horizontal fiscal equalization principle, which considers the
differing costs of providing services in each province. See id. In India, the
President considers the recommendations of a Finance Commission each year
before determining what percentage of the net proceeds of any tax each provincial
government will receive. See INDIA CONST. arts. 269, 270, 275. A consideration of
which provincial governments paid the tax greatly influences this determination.
Id. In Austria, the federal government distributes revenue to the regional
governments based on tax revenue criteria, (regional or local revenue of a tax) and
demographic criteria (the number of inhabitants of a province). See FEDERAL
MINISTRY OF FINANCE AUSTRIA, FISCAL EQUALIZATION SYSTEM IN AUSTRIA 2,
available at http://english.bmf.gv.at/Budget/IntergovernmentalFi_252/Fiscal_
Equalisation_System.pdf.
250. See Ronald L. Watts, Forum of Federations, Processes for Adjusting
Federal Financial Relations: Examples from Austria and Canada, in FISCAL
RELATIONS IN FOUR COUNTRIES: FOUR ESSAYS 17, 21 (Paul. M. Boothe ed., 2003)
[hereinafter Watts, Forum of Federations] (noting that the federal governments in
Australia, India, and South Africa establish different forms of standing or periodic
commissions to analyze their respective distributive formulas, making
recommendations to parliament when appropriate); see also id. (recognizing that
Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Belgium have parliamentary committees that
determine financial transfers to the regions).
251. See Jimenez, supra note 248, at 23 (interpreting Article 117 of the Iraq
constitution as a means of providing harmony between the governorates while
fairly distributing the wealth of the nation).
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government entities, and finally a mechanism to ensure crossgovernment and sectarian dialogue.
1. Framework Legislation Delineating Governmental
Responsibilities
In order to minimize friction between various government
institutions, Iraq could benefit from a framework of governance that
will clearly identify the role of the regional and central institutions.252
Such framework legislation would allow the federal government to
set forth those powers that are within its exclusive competence
and/or those powers that may be shared with the governorates.253
Consistent with this guiding framework, the governorates may then
adopt implementing policies and legislation. 254 Framework
legislation differs from other federally-enacted laws in that it
typically provides only a guiding principle or goal that governorate
governments must adhere to when adopting implementing
legislation. 255 Framework legislation therefore ensures a unified
federal policy while providing flexibility to the governorates in
carrying out that policy.
2. Coordination and Dispute Resolution Committees
Iraqi federalism could also benefit from the development of
mechanisms that foster cooperation between the central government
and governorates in the administration of their exclusive and shared
252. See Haysom, supra note 226, at 146 (advocating a more balanced division
of powers between the federal and regional levels).
253. See generally B-VG (Aust.) art. 12 (differentiating the powers delegated to
Austria’s federal from those delegated to the regional governing bodies).
254. See GG (F.R.G.) art. 75 (providing the federal government the power to
define broad framework legislation which the regions are responsible for
implementing through their own detailed legislation). Although Article 75 of the
German Constitution was abrogated in 2006, the provision still establishes a
feasible framework for Iraq. Id. (mentioning, briefly, the abrogation of Article 75
during the constitutional reform in 2006). See also B-VG (Aust.) art. 11-14 (listing
policy areas in which the federal government is responsible for enacting
framework legislation, while the Länder, or provincial governments, are
responsible for enacting implementation legislation).
255. See B-VG (Aust.) art. 14 (demonstrating that Austria’s constitution
provides the federal government the power to enact framework legislation but
limits that power by providing regional bodies the power to implement the
framework laws).
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powers, and help increase the level of interaction and connection
between the levels of government. 256 Two such mechanisms may
include: (1) formal and ad hoc coordination committees; 257 and
(2) joint entities tasked with resolving disputes outside the formal
judicial system. 258 Such committees are within the boundaries of the
Constitution, 259 and would allow the federal and sub-federal
256. While the Spanish Constitution allows the National Government and the
Autonomous Communities to legislate in areas of exclusive competence, the
National Government also may appoint a representative to serve in the government
of an Autonomous Community to coordinate administration of National
Government policies with those of the Autonomous Community. See C.E. art. 69;
see also id. art. 69 (providing that the Senate, one house of the Cortes Generales
(the Spanish national legislature), shall represent the interests of the provinces and
the Autonomous Communities).
257. See, e.g., Act on Autonomy of Åland, Ch. 8, available at
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1991/en19911144.pdf (providing for the
Åland Delegation, a joint council that facilitates coordination between the central
Finnish and Åland Island governments); The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement:
The Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, 1998, available at
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/ni/ni4.html#BIIC (creating the British-Irish InterGovernmental Conference); Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat
(CICS) Website, http://www.scics.gc.ca/35years_e.html (describing Canada’s
annual First Ministers’ Conference that brings together the Canadian Prime
Minister and the premiers of the provinces).
258. See S. AFR. CONST. § 76 (requiring a Mediation Committee consisting of
both national and provincial delegations to address legislation involving the
provinces when the two chambers of parliament disagree). If the disagreement is
not resolved in the Mediation Committee, the legislation in question can only be
passed by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. See id.; Bougainville
Peace Agreement (Papua N.G.) arts. 263-67 (creating an intermediary between
Papua New Guinea and Bougainville to resolve disputes prior to mediation and
arbitration). If mediation and arbitration fails, the parties can submit their dispute
to the courts. See id.; The Greenland Home Rule Act, Act No. 577, ch. 1, 1978,
available at http://www.stm.dk/Index/dokumenter.asp?o=71&n=1&d=1059&s=2
&str=stor (establishing an ad hoc mediation committee designed to address
conflicts between the central Danish government and Greenland’s provincial
governments); Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, ch.
4, 1999, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/MHII6599VZ?OpenDocument (developing a Commission which addresses disputes
regarding resource ownership and allocation); see also Matthew T. Simpson, Iraqi
High Court Authority: A State-Practice Review of the Source of High Court
Authority and an Assessment of the Iraq Constitution, ISLAMIC L. & L. OF MUSLIM
WORLD, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1061101
#PaperDownload (providing a thorough analysis of the provisions relating to Iraqi
High Court authority).
259. See IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 105 (providing that “other independent
commissions may be established according to need and necessity by a law.”).
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governments to communicate with each other. In the event that a
dispute were to arise, the dispute resolution committee would
provide Iraqis with a means for resolving the dispute before sending
it to the judicial branch.

F. FEDERAL SAFEGUARDS
In recognition of the asymmetries of power and diversity that exist
in modern day Iraq, Iraqis could benefit from the development of
several safeguards to ensure respect for the rights of both sub-federal
entities, and the minority populations in those areas.
1. Commission to Protect the Rights of Regions and Governorates
The establishment of a commission to protect the rights of regions
and governorates is essential to stabilizing the political climate in
Iraq. Article 102 of the Iraq Constitution provides for the
establishment of a public Commission “to guarantee the rights of the
regions and governorates that are not organized in a region.” 260 This
Article stipulates that the Commission should include representatives
from the federal government as well as representatives from the
governments of the regions and governorates not organized in a
region. 261 According to the Constitution, the Commission’s structure
and responsibilities are to be defined by law. 262
In establishing this Commission, the Iraqi legislature could look to
several relevant precedents including those found in South Africa,
Australia, Bahrain, Kenya, Thailand, Lebanon, Yemen, and the
United Kingdom. 263 Comprehensive and realistic objectives for the
Commission can ensure that its members, the National Government,
and the Iraqi citizenry have confidence in the Commission’s
260. See id. art. 102 (requiring the establishment of a commission that will be
the voice of regions that are not organized in a manner similar to the governorates).
261. See id. (requiring the participation of not only individuals from the region,
but also representatives from the federal government).
262. See id. art. 102-03 (identifying the purpose of the Commission, the
individuals that will partake in the Commission, and the Commission’s roles).
263. It should be noted that these examples often refer to the rights of “local
governments” (such as district and sub-district governments) rather than higher
orders of government such as those of the region and governorates. Nevertheless,
these structures and precedents can be applied to the Commission and the interests
of Iraq’s regions and governorates not organized in a region.
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activities. Possible objectives include: (1) supporting democratic
governance; (2) representing the interests of the governments of the
regions and governorates not organized in a region at the national
and international level; (3) improving the capacity of regional and
governorate government bodies; (4) providing a forum for
information-sharing; and (5) building relationship with the citizenry.
2. Commission for the Protection of Minority Rights and Minority
Rights Ombudsmen
The Iraqi Constitution provides that, “Iraqis are equal before the
law without discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity,
nationality, origin, color, religion, creed, belief or opinion, or
economic and social status,” 264 and acknowledges that Iraq is “a
country of many nationalities, religions and sects.” 265 Minority
groups, including the Armenian, Assyrians, Caldeans, and Turkmen,
are guaranteed specific political, cultural, and educational rights. 266
Despite these protections, the political instability in Iraq presents a
high risk of disenfranchisement and isolation for Iraq’s minorities
and abuse of their rights. Therefore, efforts should be made to ensure
that Iraq’s many minorities will be protected regardless of future
changes to the structure of Iraqi governance and the extent to which
political and fiscal powers are devolved. As mentioned above, the
diversity and intermingling of Iraq’s many ethnic populations places
the Sunni, Shi’a and Kurd in the minority in certain governorates. 267
Minority protections are therefore necessary not only to protect those
groups currently considered minorities by the Constitution, but also
those groups that experience majority status in one governorate, and
minority status in another.
The government therefore needs mechanisms to ensure the
representation and protection of minorities. Two of these
mechanisms include a commission for the protection of minority
rights and a minority rights ombudsman. Article 99 of the Iraqi
264. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 14.
265. Id. art. 3; see also Jimenez, supra note 248, at 23 (assessing several of the
key provisions of the 2005 Iraq Constitution).
266. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 121.
267. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the vast ethnic disparity within the
governorates and urban areas of Iraq).
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Constitution mandates a High Commission for Human Rights (“High
Commission”). 268 Within this High Commission, a Council or
Commission for Iraqi Minorities could be established. The purpose
of a High Commission includes promoting laws aimed at protecting
human rights and establishing a system of receiving complaints for
rights violations. 269 Similarly, a Commission for Iraqi Minorities
could focus on promulgating legislation and receiving complaints, 270
as well as ensuring restitution for violations by enumerating the
rights of oppressed or abused minorities to regain property or pursue
other forms of redress. 271
In addition to, or as part of, an Iraqi commission for the protection
of minority rights, Iraq may also consider building upon the concept
of a Minority Ombudsman first articulated in the TAL. 272 Article 50
of the TAL provides for a National Commission for Human Rights,
268. See IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 99 (creating multiple “High Commissions” for
the regulation of human rights and public integrity, monitored by the Council of
Representatives).
269. See The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional
Period [TAL], art. 50 (stating the purpose of the High Commissions and principles
on which it should be based); see also PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY
GROUP, THE IRAQ FEDERATION COUNCIL: LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING GUIDE (2006),
available at http://www.pilpg.org/areas/peacebuilding/simulations/iraq/PILPGIraq
FedCouncilGuide.pdf [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING GUIDE] (explaining the
various functions that the High Commission could possibly fulfill).
270. See, e.g., National Commission for Minorities Website, http://ncm.nic.in/
(last visited Sept. 8, 2008) (identifying the need for a commission in a country with
a similarly diverse ethnic composition).
271. See generally The Secretary-General, Preparatory Comm., Preparatory
Meetings and Activities at the International, Regional and National Levels, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.189/PC.1/8 (Apr. 26, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/
WCAR/1.8e.pdf (describing an organization that provided remedies for human
rights and minority rights violations). The actions taken by the South African
Human Rights Commission included a counseling hotline, a racism audit by an
independent evaluator required by all public and private institutions, increased
public awareness about rights, a media fairness inquiry, and efforts to provide a
judicial forum for redress. See id. ¶¶ 62-64. The report also stated that exemplary
countries were taking actions to provide remedies through “recourse to national
institutions, reporting of violations to law enforcement officials, prompt and
effective action by bodies responsible for the administration of justice, educational
activities that focused on curbing and eliminating racial discrimination, and the
activities of the media, which should promote understanding and tolerance.” See
id. ¶ 16.
272. See TAL art. 50 (establishing the Office of the Ombudsman, which inquires
into complaints lodged by citizens against governmental authorities).
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under which there is an Office of the Ombudsman to receive, initiate,
and investigate complaints of government actions that are “arbitrary
or contrary to law.” 273 The purpose of the Ombudsman is to guard
protection of minority rights through investigation of abuse and
initiation of legal methods of redress for rights violations. 274

CONCLUSION
Despite the concerns of the ethno-sectarian divisionists, the way
forward for Iraq is not one of entrenched ethno-sectarian divide and
mistrust, but rather the creation of a modern federal state that builds
upon Iraq’s existing political and legal structures in a manner
consistent with Iraq’s complex historical identity.
A stable political future for Iraq begins with the fundamental
position that Iraq requires a federal structure based upon an eighteen
governorate model as set forth in the Constitution. With the subfederal boundaries already drawn, Iraqi political leaders are in a
position to devolve appropriate power to these entities in an
asymmetric and gradual manner. With this power devolution, Iraq
would benefit from the development of systems of resource and
revenue distribution to promote fair and equitable economic growth
across the federation. Coordination mechanisms such as framework

273. Id.; see also IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 138 (annulling the TAL and its
Annex, except for Articles 53(A) and 58). The TAL remains relevant in this
instance, however, because the National Commission for Human Rights was
formed under the TAL.
274. See Zsuzsanna Antal, Introduction to Hungarian Law Research,
GLOBALEX (2005), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Hungary.htm (last
visited Oct. 15, 2008) (describing the role of the Hungarian Ombudsman for the
Protection of National and Minority Rights elected by a two-thirds parliamentary
vote); see also Maxine Sleeper, Note, Anti-Discrimination Laws in Eastern
Europe: Towards Effective Implementation 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 177, 196,
198 (2001) (explaining that the Hungarian Ombudsman has been especially active
in ensuring educational opportunities for minorities); Istvan Riba, Minority SelfGovernments in Hungary, HUNGARIAN Q., Vol. XL, No. 155, Aug. 1999, at 80,
available at http://www.hungarianquarterly.com/no155/080.html (stating the
effectiveness of the Hungarian Ombudsman in providing assistance to minorities
whose self-governance in regions was challenged by the majority population).
Other countries with Ombudsman offices include Greece, Macedonia, Kosovo,
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro. See
Ombudsman Worldwide Offices, http://www.law.ualberta.ca/centres/ioi/Links
/Worldwide-Offices.php (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
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legislation and dispute resolution committees are also necessary to
ensure that the transition to viable federalism occurs with minimal
encumbrance. To respect the complex and diverse identities of Iraqis,
safeguards need to be established to protect the rights of sub-federal
entities and Iraq’s many minorities.
Thus, the political future of Iraq is not a return to failed
approaches of division, but rather the construction of a viable
modern federal state that promotes unity, political compromise, and
consensus building.

